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Impact assessment was introduced with the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) in 1969. Following the
federal lead, many states adopted similarly modelled
environmental policy acts (SEPAs). The discussion of SEPAs
focuses on the New England states. Connecticut,
Massachusetts, and Vermont have laws that require a
comprehensive review of environmental impacts. New
Hampshire, Maine, and Rhode Island, instead, rely on
fragmented permit processes and NEPA for environmental
review.
Seven case studies were prepared to illustrate the
implementation of SEPAs and NEPA in each of the New England
states. Four issues emerged from the analysis of the case
studies: projects are defined prior, and not during,
impact assessment; technical information is secondary when
the project definition is controversial; public
participation plays a small role in impact assessment; and
although participants learn within a particular case, this
experience and knowledge does not extend to other cases.
A proposal is made to institutionalize a non-partisan
convenor in the impact assessment process. The convenor
will structure public participation, act as a liaison
between the public and the lead agency, and document the
process.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Research Question
A discussion of impact assessment must necessarily
begin by introducing the National Environmental Policy Act
1
(NEPA). Passed in 1969, NEPA declared a national
commitment to the protection of the environment. Adding
muscle to this commitment NEPA established a national
environmental policy, translated the commitment into agency
action with the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)
requirement, and created the Council on Environmental
Quality (CEO) to interpret and enforce this national
commitment.
As a procedural reform to federal decision making NEPA
directs federal agencies to consider the impacts of their
actions on the environment during the planning stages. Due
to the emphasis on evaluation before action, the adage,
"look before you leap," is frequently linked to impact
assessment. In the form of an EIS, agencies assess and
document the environmental impacts that can reasonably be
expected to follow the implementation of a particular
policy, program or project. Therefore, implicitly and
explicitly, NEPA guides federal agencies to: (1) forecast
and assess impacts from a proposed action; (2) apply this
information to the planning and decision making process; and
-(3) protect and enhance the quality of the environment.
Impact assessment has become an integral part of
decision making in federal and state governments. Ideally,
impact assessment at both the federal and state level should
be used in the early stages to influence the project
definition and consideration of alternatives. Relevant and
credible technical information should be used to eliminate
infeasible alternatives and continue to refine the project
definition. Both the project definition and use of
technical information should be topics for a genuine public
dialogue. Not only does this ideal model lead to sound and
wise environmental decision making, but the parties learn to
be effective within the impact assessment process. The
government and the public learn that through impact
assessment they can meet their objectives, work
cooperatively and protect the quality of the environment.
The purpose of this thesis is to look at federal and
state impact assessment requirements, generally, and then
through case studies drawn from the New England region to
ask whether these ideals are being met.
Defining Key Terms
Impact assessment is an ad-hoc process for
systematically forecasting and evaluating changes to the
natural and social environment that can be reasonably
expected to follow from the implementation of a proposal.
It is an ad-hoc process because a total methodology must be
designed to suit the unique attributes of the proposal.
Although many proposals are similar in character (e.g.
housing developments, highway projects) or rely on
2
professional conventions to forecast impacts (e.g.
measuring dissolved oxygen or traffic counts) a methodology
must address the particular social and natural environment
of the proposal. Two shopping malls can have the same
dimensions and appearance but may suggest qualitatively
different changes to the ecosystem and nearby residents.
Studies that focus too much on convention and not enough on
the unique attributes of the site can be problematic.
Impact assessment is systematic because as a matter of
legislative mandate, specific topics must be addressed e.g.
unavoidable adverse impacts and alternatives to the
proposal. Impact assessment is a vehicle to forecast
changes to the natural and social environment. Evaluation
of those changes are informed by technical analysis. In the
end, human values translate the scientific studies into a
3
socially relevant context.
Impact assessment typically takes the form of a written
document. The document is known by different names at the
federal and state level; the National Environmental Policy
Act requires agencies to write an Environmental Impact
Statement, the Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act
requires an Environmental Impact Report, and the Connecticut
Environmental Protection Act requires an Environmental
Impact Evaluation.
Requirements for impact assessment are a response to
the collective recognition that large-scale projects
initiated by both the public and private sectors do not
simply begin with construction and end with the completion
of a structure. Impact assessment commences at the initial
planning stages of a project (e.g. program definition and
consideration of alternatives), and includes an inter-agency
and public review. Therefore, impact assessment is both a
document and a process.
Environmental decision making is the end to which
4
impact assessment is the means. The process of impact
assessment stops short of making the actual decision of
whether or not to proceed with the proposal. In general,
impact assessment has been designed to organize analysis and
evaluation in order to inform decision making. The written
document reports the project definition, potential
environmental impacts, methodologies used to forecast
impacts, evaluations about the signficance of impacts, and
public comments; all of which provide the substance from
which a wise decision can be made.
Environmental decision making requires both scientific
analysis and value judgements. Ideally, environmental
decision making should be shaped, by technical studies, the
views of the public, and explicit and subjective evaluations
by the decision making body regarding social costs and
benefits of the forecasted impacts.
Bounding thg 8nglysis
Soon after NEPA was passed, state governments started
adopting similarly modelled environmental policy acts.
Therefore, to explore the role that impact assessment plays
in environmental decision making it is conceivable to look
at the entire country at both the federal and state level.
Given the time constraints of this study, the universe
of impact assessment was bounded to provide an interesting
and focused sample. Limiting the study geographically would
permit a more intensive analysis and foster interesting
comparisons. Additionally, a reasonably bounded study
would allow the analysis to extend beyond the initial
question of what role impact assessment plays in
environmental decision making to ask whether the ideal model
of impact assessment has been achieved in practice.
The physical unit of analysis for this study is New
England, which includes Connecticut, Rhode Island,
Massachusetts, Vermont., New Hampshire, and Maine. These
states are distinguishable by their diverse natural and
social environments, and for the purposes of this study, by
the presence or absence of formal impact assessment
requirements. Of these states, Connecticut, Massachusetts,
5
and Vermont have impact assessment requirements or the
6
equivilant. Rhode Island, New Hampshire, and Maine do not
have comprehensive environmental laws. Alternatively, they
rely on NEPA and state licensing procedures to assess the
environmental impacts of proposals.
New England provides a rich laboratory of natural
resources and political communities to study impact
assessment. This analysis will use a series of case studies
to look comparatively at a variety of projects and impact
assessment processes in this region. The cases will be used
as a means to explore federal and state examples of impact
assessment in New England over the past ten years.
Specifically, I will use the case studies to ask four
questions; (1) Does impact assessment shape the project
definition, i.e. is it used during the planning phase? (2)
Is technical information used to improve the project
definition and to inform the public? (3) Does the public
have a meaningful role in this process? (4) Do lead
agencies and public participants learn to use impact
assessment more effectively as a result of their experience?
Oggrnach
My approach is described more fully in Appendix A.
Because this analysis addresses a fairly large geographical
area and time frame, a series of case studies is used to
capture the diversity embodied by the New England states
7
with respect to impact assessment. Case studies were
8
prepared from each state, collectively spanning 1975-1985.
The cases provide a fresh source of information to explore
impact assessment and its role in environmental decision
making in New England at both the federal and state level.
The concluding analysis will look across the cases and over
time to ask how impact assessment shapes the project, uses
technical information to inform the assessment, responds to
public concerns, and, generally, if impact assessment is a
learning process.
The case studies were identified through a
questionnaire that was sent to approximately 100
environmental professionals in New England. These
individuals were asked to, "... list a few of the projects,
policies or programs, that stand out in your mind as having
the greatest impact (either positive or negative) on
environmental quality in New England over the past 10
9
years." Contrary to my expectations, the responses to
the questionnaire were quite diverse. Anticipating
approximately ten modal responses, it was quite a surprise
to receive 130 different answers to this question. Most
respondants named projects with which they had personal
experience. I had incorrectly assumed that people would
focus on cases of national or regional recognition. These
findings suggest that people are most concerned about and
aware of the quality of the environment with which they have
direct contact.
Underlying the diversity of responses were several
general catagories. These catagories may be indicative of
the environmental issues that are most important in New
England. The ten catagories into which all of the
responses were grouped (with the frequency of response noted
in parenthesis) are: waste management (46), water quality
(50), energy (40), land use (31), transportation (14),
wetlands (17), coastal zone (13), acid rain (8), air
quality (9), and miscellaneous (17).
Within these catagories, seven projects that were
mentioned in the survey were selected to serve as the focal
point for case studies. The case studies, which are
summarized in Chapter IV are:
1. Criminal Court Facility, Hartford, Connecticut.
2. Big River Reservoir, Rhode Island.
Wastewater Treatment Facility Siting, Boston Harbor,
Massachusetts.
4. Bay View Towers, Hull, Massachusetts.
5. Pyramid Mall, Chittendon County, Vermont.
6. Extension of Interstate 93 through Franconia Notch,
New Hampshire.
7. Dickey-Lincoln School Lakes Project, Aroostook County,
Maine.
Structure of Study
The section that follows will provide an historical
overview of NEPA and the context in which the landmark
legislation was passed. Recounting the political climate of
the late 1960s and some of the forces, namely the
environmental movement and dissatisfaction with existing
legislation, that ultimately lead to NEPA will be discussed.
The next section will look at some of the early
commentary on NEPA. Largely as a result of the
comprehensive nature of this law and the demands it put on
the federal bureaucracy, NEPA earned a reputation as both
the bete noire and the magna carta of the environmental
movement. The early years of this federal decision making
reform were a time of agency adjustment and heavy court
involvment.
NEPA has served as a model for state environmental
policy acts (SEFAs). Looking first at SEPAs, in general,
and then at specific cases, I will attempt to determine the
extent to which impact assessment in the New England states
serve the four functions regarding project definition,
technical information, public participation and learning.
II.IMPACT ASSESSMENT: HISTORICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT
Historical Overview
The vanguard of impact assessment legislation, the
National Environmental Policy Act, was passed in 1969 under
1
the Nixon administration. NEPA, an important gesture by the
federal government, was a formal recognition of a widespread
2
environmental ethos in this country. NEPA can be understood
as a discrete response by the federal government to the
3
intensifying public demand for government accountability
4
regarding environmental protection. Because NEPA is
5
landmark legislation in the field of environmental
protection,a brief historical overview of the era in which it
was passed is appropriate.
Rachel Carson's classic, Silent Spring is considered to
have been an important agent for raising Americans'
consciousness about the severity and magnitude of the
6
pollution in the country. The recognition of severe water
quality problems of both the Mississippi River and Lake Erie,
concentration of DDT in the foodchain, and the environmental
destruction that accompanied the Vietnam War, contributed to
7
the political climate of the 1960's.
The political climate was in transition. The issue of
environmental quality had, irrevocably, become a political
issue. In addition to concern about the current implications
of a polluted environment, the public began to accept and
defend having an ethical obligation to protect the
environment for future generations.
Since the federal government is largely responsible for
planning and implementing projects on a grand scale, the
mounting public concern for environmental quality was focused
8
at that level. By the mid 1960's the public was demanding a
formal, participatory role in these government-sponsored
projects which, ultimately, affected their lives and
communities. Caldwell says,
"By the late nineteen-sixties there was widespread belief
among environmentally concerned and politically active
citizens that federal agencies and programs were themselves
leading factors in environmental degradation. Environmental
issues had pitted organized citizen groups against
governmental agencies responding primarily to what their
critics perceived as relatively short-term and narrowly-
defined economic interests. Massive environment-shaping
programs of the federal government seemed unresponsive to
aesthetic, cultural or ecological values, and their decision
processes inaccessible to questionning by the general
public."9
When government agencies did consider the environmental
impacts of a proposal the effort tended to be defined by
boundaries of the bureaucracy, and not by the natural
resources which would be affected by the proposal. Federal
legislation "...has for the most part been formulated as an
array of single-purpose legislative instruments, each
10
directed toward some specific pollution problem."
One piece of legislation that began to move away from
this narrowly defined project evaluation and is considered to
be an important precursor to NEPA was the Department of
Transportation (DOT) Act of 1966 as amended by the Federal-
Aid Highway Act of 1968. This Act, as amended, discouraged
proposals that required the use of,
"land from a public park, recreation area, or wildlife or
waterfowl refuge of national, state, or local significance
... or any land from an historic site of national, state, or
local signficance ... unless (1) there is no feasible and
prudent alternative to the use of such land, and (2) such
program includes all possible planning to minimize harm to
such park, recreation area, wildlife and waterfowl refuge, or
historic site resulting from such use."11
Therefore, the seeds of NEPA were present in existing
federal legislation. NEPA went beyond the DOT Act and
required federal agencies to undertake and document a
comprehensive review, of their activities, consult relevant
agencies, and employ an interdisciplinary approach in
planning and decision making. In 1969, NEPA was passed and,
symbolically, was the first piece of legislation signed into
law in what would later be known as the environmental decade.
The National Environmental Policy Act
The purpose of NEPA was, "To declare a national policy
which will encourage the productive and enjoyable harmony
between man and his environment; to promote efforts which
will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and
biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of man; to
enrich the understanding of the ecological systems and
natural resources important to the Nation; and to establish
12
the Council on Environmental Quality."
Title 1 Section 101(b) establishes that, "In order to
carry out the policy set forth in this Act, it is the
continuing responsibility of the Federal Government to use
all practicable means,. consistent with other considerations
of national policy, to improve and coordinate Federal plans,
functions, programs and resources ...
Although NEPA retained much of its substance as it came
through the House and the Senate as a bill, "the ultimate act
represented a compromise of a variety of pressures and points
13
of view." The bill that was introduced in the House,
"focused primarily on the creation of the Council on
Environmental Quality, omitting the part of the bill which in
day to day operations has become one of the most important
aspects. The House bill did not contain the Section 102
requirements that environmental impact statements be filed
before federal projects with major impacts on the environment
could be undertaken."14
Both bills defined a strong and self-directed Council on
15
Environmental Quality (CEQ). Through the course of
Congressional debate and revision the powers of the advisory
16
office were considerably abridged. CEQ's level of influence
has certainly fluctuated since it was first created. The
presence of CEO was felt during the Nixon and Carter
administration, but it has been noticeably absent under the
17
current Reagan administration.
As an executive level advisory council the CEQ sits in a
somewhat precarious position in terms of how effectively it
can carry out its role as, "the keeper of the consciense" of
18
NEPA because "...its function of advising the president
necessarily recedes when a president is disinclined to hear
19
advice from those charged with environmental protection."
Recent critics have recommended strengthening CEQ's charter
20
with veto power over a project and have emphasized its
21
still important role of executive-level oversight.
When NEPA was first passed, in addition to its advisory
role to the president and research responsibilities, CEO was
empowered to issue guidelines to federal agencies to aid
their preparation of Environmental Impact Statements. In
1977, Carter strengthened their authority with Executive
Order 11991 which authorized the CEO to "issue regulations
to Federal agencies for the implementation of the procedural
provisions of NEPA." The way in which CEO exercised this new
power is generally considered to be an improvement that
"stream-lined" the implementation of NEPA. Adopted
in 1979, the regulations established uniform procedures for
agency compliance with NEPA. The purpose of the regulations
was to reduce paper work and delays, and facilate better
24
decision making.
Again looking back to NEPA as a bill, the original
language addressed only the statement of policy and the
creation of the CEO. As the bill was getting close to being
passed into law, its authors noted that there was no
procedural requirmement to insure that agencies complied with
the policy statement. In what some critics have considered
to be an afterthought, the Environmental Impact Statement
25
(EIS) requirement was added to NEPA. Section 102(c)
requires that all agencies of the Federal Government shall
include "... in every recommendation or report or proposal
for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly
affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed
statement by the responsible official on --
(i) The environmental impact of the proposed action
(ii) Any adverse environmental effects which cannot be
avoided should the proposal be implemented
(iii) Alternatives to the proposed action
(iv) The relationship between local short-term uses of man's
environment and the enhancement and maintenance of long-term
productivity, and
(v) Any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of
resources which would be involved in the proposed
action should it be implemented."
The threshold for NEPA applicability to project review has
been the subject of a great deal of judicial
26
interpretation.
Generally, the NEPA process begins with a "scoping"
session which was one of the innovations of the CEQ's new
regulations. Scoping serves to identify the significant and
dismiss irrelevant issues presented by a federal proposal in
the early planning stages. The next phase is the preparation
of the Draft EIS (DEIS). Upon completion, the DEIS is made
available for review by other government agencies and the
public. The lead agency, i.e. the agency proposing the
action and preparing the EIS, receives written comments
during the review period. Typically, one public hearing is
held to receive oral testimony. The lead agency responds in
writing to comments and makes necessary revisions based on
the issues or deficiencies raised during the review. With
these changes incorporated into the DEIS and comments
attached in an appendix, the DEIS is now referred to as a
Final EIS (FEIS).
If a lead agency is found to be in violation of NEPA,
the court-ordered remedy is to require an agency to prepare a
27
Supplemental EIS to remedy the deficiency. Hoffinger
criticizes this remedy because, "an agency runs little risk
by violating NEPA, while the public may assume substantial
risk," and therefore advocates giving CEQ stronger review
28
powers.
Agency gdIustment
29
The period of agency adjustment, in the early 1970's
30
was characterized by much litigation and the involvement of
31
the federal courts. During this phase, the courts were
actively interpreting the substantive requirements of NEPA
372
and deciding when those requirements had been satisfied. In
a series of landmark decisions the federal court defined
threshold requirements for EISs, standing for plantiffs, and
34
general standards for compliance with NEPA.
Around the mid 1970's, the attitude and responsiveness
35
of the federal courts regarding NEPA litigation shifted.
At this time, the courts began to take a more conservative
approach to the interpretation of NEPA. Uncomfortable with
this level of involvement in the substantive interpretation
of NEPA the federal courts accepted fewer NEPA cases and its
reputation for being sympathetic to plantiffs (typically
environmental and citizen organizations) in these cases
waned. An indicator of this change in attitude is reflected in
statistics showing a peak of NEPA litigation in the early
1970's and then a sudden and continued drop in the mid and
36
late 1970's.
37
NEPA has been called both the "bete noire" and the
38
"magna carta" of the environmental movement. The image of
the bete noire became popular during the early days of NEPA
which were characterized by a profusion of unanticipated
39
litigation and the broad opportunities for public
intervention into government activities. The negative
connotation grew out of the frustration of government
agencies whose every action was publicly scrut.inized and
often delayed in litigation.
In these early days, when the courts were busy
interpreting NEPA and many government actions were being
40
challenged, NEPA was called a full employment act for
lawyers and consultants. NEPA was praised as a magna
carta because it is comprehensive and served as a great
equalizer of rights with respect to environmental protection.
While most of the dust has settled from the earlier
litigation, NEPA seems to have lived down of its reputation
as the bete noire. However, NEPA is not quite deserving of
the honorable title of magna carta. NEPA is a powerful piece
of legislation and when agencies meet the spirit of the Act
it is clear that the national environmental policy is being
followed. It falls short of being the magna carta because
agencies can meet the letter of the law, and be in procedural
compliance without having met the spirit, or substance of
NEPA.
In the late 70's, several retrospective analyses of NEPA
41
were prepared. The conclusions that have been drawn from
these studies are: (1) the EIS requirement has caused
federal agency personnel to be more attentive to
environmental considerations; (2) because of the public and
inter-agency review required by NEPA truly environmentally
damaging projects are not proposed; (3) time and cost
requirements for EIS preparation are not as great as
popularly held; and (4) similarly, there are fewer court
actions than might be suspected.
Environmental Resources Limited conducted a
comprehensive review of impact assessment using 55 case
42
studies. Based on these case studies and other
retrospectve analyses, I find the following to be true about
NEPA and impact assessment;
(1) impact assessment could be used more fully to shape
project definition;
(2) adequate technical procedures exist to forecast and
evaluate environmental impacts;
(3) in general, the public wants a meaningful role in the
impact assessment process; and
(4) impact assessment would be improved if people learned
during the process, and brought that experience to the next
process.
The purpose of this thesis is to take a close look at the
case studies that were prepared on impact assessment
processes in New England and ask how these four issues apply
to them.
III. NEPA as a model for SEPAs
State Environmental Folicv Aicts
Following right on the heels of NEPA, states began to
pass similarly modelled environmental policy acts,
collectively known as state environmental policy acts, or
SEPAs. Environmentalists at the state level introduced bills
for NEPA-like acts before their potency had been
1
established.
"In the instance of the National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969 ... the federal government has served as an
2
experimental laboratory for the various states." Described
3
as in "reverse of traditional notions of federalism" and a
4
"spillover effect" states have gone from adopting NEPA
practically verbatim (Puerto Rico, Montana, and New Mexico)
to making substantive changes (Connecticut, Massachustts,
California, Washington) that added explicit requirements that
5
are only implicitly contained in the federal law. The
changes that states have made beyond NEPA are most apparent
in their EIS requirements; Connecticut requires a discussion
of primary and secondary impacts, California and New York
include "growth inducing impact" of development, and
Massachusetts requires mitigation measures to minimize
environmental impacts.
Several listings of states with environmental policy
acts, their equivilants, or environmental laws that provide
6
limited review can be found. These lists vary, perhaps
according to the author's judgement regarding legislation,
executive or administrative orders, and environmental reviews
that qualify as a SEPA. Renz lists 24 SEPAs and SEPA-like
requirements.
States with EIS reggirements
California
Connecticut
Hawaii
Indiana
Maryland
Massachusetts
Minnesota
Montana
New York
North Carolina
Puerto Rico
South Dakota
Virginia
Washington
Wisconsin
States with substantive agglication of environmental laws
Michigan
Minnesota
States with limited environmental review
Arizona
Delaware
Georgia
Kentucky
Mississippi
Nevada
New Jersey
Rhode Island
Generally, SEPAs require the preparation of a document
that describes the environmental impact of a proposal,
alternatives to the proposal, and unavoidable adverse
6
environmental effects. Renz notes that SEPAs tend to follow
a common scheme,
"First a proposal surfaces which calls for action by a
governmental body. Under the requirements of a SEPA, the
governmental body determines if the action falls within the
-5
purview of the SEPA. It then determines if the environmental
effects of the proposal, if any, are signficant. If so, the
agency prepares a draft and a final EIS, and finally reaches
a decision on the proposal."9
"The specific subjects which the agency must discuss are
set out in the statute. Generally these track the
10
requirments of NEPA." State environmental policy acts
model NEPA, but most are written to avoid redundant action by
11
both federal and state agencies. Typically, the state
defers to the federal authority. SEPAs, and the review that
they necessarily entail also supplement NEPA's provisions for
public access at the federal level with greater public access
12
to the decision making process at the state level.
The Role of the State Courts
Similar to the federal courts, the state courts' early
role in SEPA interpretation was one of heavy and substantive
involvement. However, unlike the federal courts withdrawal
from NEPA interpretation, state courts have maintained their
initial level and nature of involvement,
state environmental policy acts are now construed more
broadly and applied more stringently than NEPA. State courts
tend to require environmental impact statements in situations
where federal courts would not and scrutinize the contents of
those statements more closely."13
The federal and state courts' treatment of NEPA and
SEPAs, respectively, have diverged from their initially
parallel paths. Lately, federal court decisions have served
to limit the scope of NEPA and its a-ffects on federal
decision making. Comparatively, Renz finds two reasons for
the state courts' broader application of SEPAs.
"First, early cases interpreting SEPA looked to existing
federal cases. This pre-Vermont Yankee body of federal law
tended to enforce NEPA more strictly than do federal courts
today. Later state courts looked to these state cases for
precedent, preserving a stricter state rule in that state's
jurisprudence.
But by far, the most important factor has been the state
courts' treatment of the policies of their own state acts.
While federal courts were holding that the policies of NEPA
provided only national goals, state courts were finding
precedent in SEPA policies for prima facie compliance with
the SEPA in all cases, consideration of environmental factors
in all cases, and broad substantive application of the SEPA's
requirements."14
As a result of the state courts taking the lead in
interpreting and upholding SEPAs, Pearlman predicts,
"[sihould NEPA be amended in the future, the federal
government may well look to the states for new statutory
15
language."
The Relationship Between Imgact Assessment and Planning
Impact assessment and planning serve different, but
complementary functions. Impact assessment is a process for
forecasting and evaluating environmental impacts that are
directly related to a proposal. Impact assessment is an
effective tool to mitigate the negative environmental effects
of a single proposal, but it lacks any means to coordinate
the review of several proposals. Although impact assessment
was envisioned to be thorough, it was never meant to
substitute for comprehensive planning.
Compared to impact assessment, planning embodies
normative ideas about the future. Planning addresses both
long and short term goals and ways in which those goals can
be achieved. In effect, planning trades prospective guidance
for detailed review.
Hagman suggests that impact assessment could serve as a
"one-stop" permit process that would obviate other permits
16
and general plans. This approach would put planning bodies
in a defensive role and limit their ability to guide the
cumulative effects of several proposals. The detailed review
that is required by impact assessment supplements planning
17
and policy making. Since they do not serve interchangeable
functions, their respective strengths should be combined to
create a process that is capable of precision and overview.
Focus on New England
Now that the historical context and procedural
requirements of NEPA have been explained, and the nation-wide
phenomenon of SEPAs have been introduced, let us focus on
how the New England states have responded to the federal
model.
The New England states are commonly referred to as a
region, as if they comprised a homogenous unit. However, the
way in which- they each have addressed impact assessment and
environmental protection underscore the uniqueness of each
state. The six states can be divided into two camps on this
issue; one with formal impact assessment requirements and the
other, without.
Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Vermont have
requirements for impact assessment and review. The next
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level of analysis shows that this grouping is based on
generalizations. The details of their laws and the manner in
which they are implemented set them apart. Connecticut and
Massachusetts both have, at first glance, the stereotypical
SEPA, but on closer inspection their differences become
clear.
Connecticut. The Connecticut Environmental Policy Act (CEPA)
is actually the agglomeration of two laws. The first law,
passed in 1971 is known as the Connecticut Environmental
18
Protection Act. This Act was modelled after Michigan's
Environmental Protection Act of 1970 which gave individual
citizens standing to sue to protect the environmment. It
follows that these acts have been called "citizen action" or
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"private action" Acts.
The second law in Connecticut is the Connecticut
20
Environmental Policy Act, commonly referred to as CEPA. In
general, CEPA states that Connecticut has an environmental
policy, and establishes the requirement that impact
assessment be incorporated into the state planning process.
Under CEPA, state agencies are required to produce a
document, known as the Environmental Classification Document,
that lists (1) typical agency actions which may have
signficant impacts on the state's land, water, air or other
environmental resources, or which could serve short-term to
the disadvantage of long-term environmental goals, thereby
requiring the preparation of an environmental impact
statement; (2) typical agency actions whose degree of impact
is indeterminant, in the absence of information of the
proposed location and scope of a specific action, but which
could have siginficant environmental impacts; and (3) typical
federal/state actions for which environmental impact
statements are prepared pursuant to the National
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Environmental Policy Act.
The Environmental Classification Document is approved by
the Office of Policy and Management (OPM). The Document
guides an agency's decision to prepare either an
Environmental Impact Evaluation (EIE) or a Finding of No
Significant Impact (FONSI).
The topics that an EIE is required to consider go beyond
those required by NEPA. The EIE must address (1) a
description of the proposed action; (2) the environmental
consequences of the proposed action, including direct and
indirect effects which might result during and subsequent to
the proposed action; (3) any adverse environmental effects
which cannot be avoided and irreversible and irretrievable
commitments of resources should the proposal be implemented;
(4) alternatives to the proposed action; (5) mitigation
measures proposed to minimize environmental impacts; (6) an
analysis of the short term and long term economic, social,
and environmental costs and benefits of the proposed action,
and (7) the effects of the proposed action on the use and
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conservation of energy resources. When an agency
submits a FONSI, OPM reviews it to verify that no signficant
impact is expected that would otherwise require an EIE. When
an EIE is required the scope of the assessment is determined
in a meeting between OPM, other relevant state agencies, and
the consultant that will prepare the EIE. This is typically
an internal meeting and process. The purpose of this meeting
is to determine the most important issues and interested
parties of the proposal. It is intended to guide and
facilitate the preparation of the document.
CEPA explicitly states that the EIE should be prepared
early enough so it can contribute to the decision making
process and not be used to rationalize or justify decisions
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that have already been made. A completed EIE is followed
by a review period where the state accepts comments from
state and local agencies and the general public. A public
hearing is held at the request of 25 or more individuals, or
the sponsoring agency, realizing that the project is
controversial, can initiate the public hearing process in
advance of the threshold number of requests. Public hearings
are formal events. Testimony is given and although the
project proponent is present, no response is made to comments
during this forum.
When the EIE and the review period have been completed,
the document, testimony, written comments, and proof of
procedural compliance (e.g. that notices were placed in the
newspaper) are given to OPM. In a "record of decision" OPM
states whether the issues have been adequately addressed in
the EIE.
CEPA has a fairly detailed section on liability for
failing to meet the requirements of the Act. A schedule of
payments is presented in the law. Also, based on the
Environmental Protection Act of 1970, individuals have
standing to sue to protect the environment.
Massachusetts. The Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act
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(MEPA), passed in 1972, closely follows the model of NEPA.
MEPA applies to activities undertaken by state agencies or
individuals that require a permit or financial assistance
from the state. The Environmental Impact Review Office
within the Executive Office of Environmental Affairs (EOEA)
oversees the implementation of MEPA.
When an agency or individual intends to apply for a
permit or financial assistance they must first notify the
Impact Review Office. After meeting with the proponent, the
Impact Review Office determines whether an Environmental
Impact Report (EIR) will be required or whether the proposal
is catagorically exempt. Following this consultation the
Impact Review Office issues a notice of the action and the
potential impacts in EOEA's newsletter, The Environmental
Monitor.
Under MEPA, all EIRs are required to address: The
nature and extent of the proposed project and its
environmental impact; all measures being utilized to minimize
environmental damage; any adverse short-term and long-term
environmental consequences which cannnot be avoided should
the project be undertaken; and reasonable alternatives to the
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proposed project and their environmental consequences.
For each project requiring an EIR, the scope of the EIR
is determined in consultation between the proponent and the
Impact Review Office. When a private individual applies to a
state agency for a permit, but not for funding, the scope of
the Report and alternatives that must be considered are
limited to the "subject matter jurisdiction" of the permit-
issuing agency.
The review of an EIR follows much of the same process as
the federal EIS requirement. When the Report is written, it
is referred to as a Draft EIR (DEIR). The DEIR is made
available to appropriate state agencies and the public. A
review period is held where written comments are received and
oral testimony is taken during a public hearing. Testimony
is recorded at the hearing, and again, there is no dialogue.
Comments that are received during the review period are
incorporated into the body of the DEIS or responded to in an
appendix. The inclusion of comments and any revisions the
proponent makes as a result of the public review transform
the DEIR into the Final EIR (FEIR). The Impact Review Office
determines whether the FEIR has adequately met the
requirements of MEPA.
If a court determines that information in the DEIR has
been knowingly falsified or omitted by the proponent, the
Impact Review Office will require the proponent to take any
additional measures to correct the problem. MEPA models NEPA
with respect to remedying deficiencies of an EIR with
supplemental information as compared to CEPAs liability
provi si on.
Therefore, CEPA and MEPA are alike in that they both
institutionalize impact assessment in the planning stages and
have established overseeing agencies; CEPA's Office of Policy
Management and MEPA's Environmental Impact Review Office.
Both laws establish a procedure for determining the threshold
of applicability; CEPA has the Environmental Classification
Document and MEPA has catagorical exemptions. The topics
that are required to be discussed in the EIE and the EIR are
similar that they both go beyond- the mandates of NEPA. CEPA
requires a cost benefit analysis and MEPA requires a
discussion of mitigation measures. In the case of an
inadequate impact report CEPA relies on a liability clause
and litigation while MEPA requires the deficiencies to be
remedied with supplemental information.
Vermont. Vermont has a unique process for assessing the
environmental impacts of a proposal, although it is not a
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SEPA, per se. Vermont's Land Use and Development Act, was
passed in 1970 in response to accelerated development of
recreational homes. Commonly referred to as Act 250, this
law not only established a review process, but created a
state-regional heirarchical structure to implement and
adjudicate it. Act 250 created a state-wide Environmental
Board, a policy making and appellate body; and nine District
Environmental Commissions to implement the law on a day-to-
day basis.
Act 250 is a permit process. Unlike CEPA and MEPA that
culminate in a decision that the EIE or EIR adequately
represents the important issues and includes a sound
analysis, Act 250 concludes with a decision to issue or deny
a permit. Vermont's law also differs from Connecticut's and
Massachusetts' by its threshold of applicability. Act 250
applies to all developments involving at least 10 acres of
land, compared to CEPA's and MEPA's preliminary project
review and references to their respective Environmental
Classification Document and catagorical exemptions.
The sequence of review stages in the Act 250 process
begins, for the more complex applications, with a pre-hearing
conference. Like scoping requirements, the pre-hearing
serves to alert the Commission and the project proponent to
issues that will require proportionately more attention. The
next phase is the public hearing. For the typical project,
this phase is completed in one session. However, for
politically controversial or technically complex projects,
this phase will continue until all relevant information and
analyses have been presented.
Act 250 identifies statutory parties to each permit
process. Statutory parties include the applicant, state,
local, and regional agencies, and adjoining landowners. The
Commission can also use its discretion to admit other parties
that may be affected by the proposal or whose expertise may
facilitate the review. The statutory parties are represented
by lawyers during the hearings. Unlike the hearings in the
CEPA and MEPA process, the Act 250 hearings, although
conducted in a courtroom setting, are characterized by
dialogue between statutory parties, expert witnesses and the
Commissioners. The hearing process for Act 250 is noticeably
richer than CEPA or MEPA processes.
Act 250 requires all permit applications to demonstrate
that ten criteria have been met. These criteria address:
(1) water and air pollution, (2) water supply, (3) water
availability, (4) soil erosion, (5) highway congestion, (6)
provision of educational services, (7) provision of
municipal services, (8) natural beauty and natural areas,
(9) conformance with the state Capability and Development
Plan, and (10) conformance with regional and local plans.
The Commission is not empowered to work with the applicant to
make the permit acceptable however they may issue a
conditional permit, i.e. conditional upon meeting certain
standards that are specified by the Commission.
The Environmental Board, a quasi-judicial body sits as a
board of appeals to the Commissions' decisions. The Act 250
process has a built-in alternative to litigation. While CEPA
and MEPA are readily distinguishable they stand together when
compared to Vermont's Act 250 permit process. Although some
classifications of SEPAs may omit mentioning the Land Use and
Development Act because of its title, it is certainly as much
of an impact assessment process as CEPA and MEPA.
Turning to the states without formal comprehensive
mandates for impact assessment, again we see important
differences in the way impact assessment and environmental
protection are handled.
Rhode Island. In Rhode Island, most of the major projects
are federally sponsored. Therefore, impact assessment is
conducted, but under the auspices of NEPA. The adoption of a
SEPA is not a priority in this state.
The only comprehensive review of state actions are the
State Planning Review Project Notification and Review System
and the State Guide Plan that provide a check that a project
is consistent with an agency's charter. Although they
provide a project review, they do not qualify as impact
assessment processes. A formal state environmental review is
conducted by the Port Authority and Economic Development
Corporation prior to development at Qwonset Point-Davisville,
an environmentally sensitive area. This is the extent of
state-sponsored impact assessment in Rhode Island.
Maine. Maine's Environmental Bureaus; Land, Air, Water, Oil
and Hazardous Material Control, each have their own permit
processes and requirements. The exact process is not evident
without a proposal for which to seek specific permits. When
a developer applies to any one of the Bureaus for a permit,
the proposal is reviewed and permits from that Bureau are
identified. The "first-stop" Bureau will refer the developer
to all other relevant Bureaus. It is of no consequence which
Bureau's door the developer walks through first.
New Hampshire. Similar to Maine, New Hampshire's
environmental laws are fragmented according to the resources
that they seek to protect. The entire network of laws is
spelled out in The State RegUIatgry Handbook that is produced
by the Office of State Plannng.
The manual presents in a clear, straightforward manner
activities that may require a license, permit, or
certificate. The manual also discusses the standards used by
state agencies in reviewing applications, and indicates where
a developer can find more information about a specific
regulated activity. The permits, licenses, and certificates
that are listed address activities which have a direct impact
on the environment. The manual notes that although
objectives vary among agencies, they generally seek to
minimize negative impacts to the natural environment and
protect public health.
Conclusion
Just among the six New England states there is a
diversity of impact assessment legislation and environmental
review. They can easily be divided into two groups; with and
without a state environmental policy act (or its equivilant).
However, on closer inspection the scope of the review,
invitation to the public, and flexibility set them apart.
The states without SEPAs find that the fragmented regulatory
approach is adequate because (1) although permits and review
processes appear fragmented, they are linked. New Hampshire,
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in particular, has made an effort to make these connections
explicit; and (2) most of the very large projects that are
likely to have an impact on the environment are federally
sponsored, and therefore, impact assessment is
comprehensively addressed under NEPA.
The diversity of the environmental review processes in
each state was reflected in the findings of the case studies.
The case studies are an illustrative device for exploring the
diversity of environmental review procedures, how they
address project definition., use of technical information,
public participation, and learning, in New England under a
variety of circumstances.
IV. ANALYSIS
Introduction
A questionnaire was sent to more than 100 individuals in
New England with professional experience in impact
assessment. The primary purpose of the questionnaire was to
identify case studies to illustrate the various impact
assessment processes that are used in New England. As
discussed above, Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Vermont have
state-wide laws; CEPA, MEPA, and Act 250, that require impact
assessment. Maine, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island do not
have formal procedures for conducting a comprehensive
assessments of proposals. In lieu of state environmental
policy acts, the latter three states rely primarily on
fragmented permit processes and NEPA for impact assessment.
The specific case studies were chosen in order to
provide a rich sampling of environmental issues that
collectively span a ten year period. The cases on which this
analysis is based constitute a medley of impact assessment
legislation, types of projects, key environmental issues, and
outcomes. Each case study was chosen because it contributed
to the richness of the sample. They were not chosen to
represent the most important or controversial instance of
impact assessment, nor were they intended to, individually,
symbolize the most pressing environmental issues of each
state; in fact, the cases probably are relevant to all of the
states.
Although each of the cases have unique qualities,
together, they contribute to the body of literature on impact
assessment. The particular attributes of each case at first
suggests that they are qualitatively different and provide no
basis for comparison. For example, some of the cases are
located in urban environments while others are in rural,
suburban, or wilderness areas. Some cases pivot on the role
of the environmental impact document while other were
relatively unaffected by one.
However, the real instruction comes from highlighting
the differences and underscoring the similarities that
surface when they are considered as a group. The purpose of
the case studies is to use actual and contemporary examples
to focus the analysis and ask how impact assessment affects
environmental decision making. Before proceeding with this
1
analysis, an overview of each case is appropriate.
Case Study Summaries
2
Criminal Court Facility. Hartford . Connecticut. The State
Judicial Department has been intending to build a new Court
Facility to provide much-needed office and courtroom space
for criminal cases since 1964. Although it predates
Connecticut's Environmental Policy Act (CEPA), the Court
Facility was still in the planning stages when CEPA was
passed. The proposal, therefore, was subject to the impact
assessment requirements of CEPA. The impact assessment
process was completed in 1982 and construction began in 1983.
At this writing, construction of the new Criminal Court
Facility is nearly complete.
While the facility was continually redesigned, and the
availability of funds fluctuated only the site remained
constant. The site, most of which is owned by the Judicial
Department is located just across the street from the
existing state court building. A desirable feature of this
close proximity is that the two buildings could be physically
connected with a pedestrian bridge.
The site for the new Criminal Court Facility is located
at the southwestern edge of Hartford's Capitol Center
District. The Capitol Center District, in downtown Hartford,
is a planning unit in which most of Connecticut's state
government buildings are located. The building and grounds
within its borders are clearly legible as a civic center.
Walk one block west of the Capitol Center District and
you will have entered, what appears to be, a residential
district. Look at the multi-family houses more closely, you
will see that many of these buildings are occupied by law
firms. Continue walking westward and within the next block
you will be in a lively residential area.
The residents that live within a block of the Capitol
Center District are disturbed about the increasing state
presence in the neighborhood. Their interests, articulated
by Hartford Area Rally Together (HART) and the Hungerford
Block Association, are to maintain the integrity of the
neighborhood despite the Judicial Department's history of
property acquisition in the area. The residents are most
concerned about the growing trend of law firms, desiring to
be close to the state courts, that buy inexpensive
residential buildings for their offices. The conversion of
residential to office use is a secondary impact of the
state's presence.
It was common knowledge that the project was essentially
predetermined prior to any formal impact assessment.
However, Department of Administrative Services (DAS) and
Bureau of Public Works (BPW) responded to a suggestion by the
Hart-ford Architectural Conservancy (HAC) and conducted a
public workshop. The workshop provided a forum to present
and discuss plans for the new Court Facility. Public
comments on the siting and design influenced the final plan
for the new Court Facility.
Realizing that the project was clearly defined prior to
the workshop the neighborhood organizations eventually sought
other means to protect their interests. HART and the
Hungerford Block Association have been working with the City
Planning Department to downzone the residential-o-FFice
designation to an exclusively residential district.
HAC was concerned about this project because the site is
within the Frog Hollow Historic District. In the seventeenth
century some of Connecticut's first mills had located in this
area along the, now defunct, Park River. The River produced
the marshy conditions that gave the District its, once
descriptive, name. HAC wanted to preserve several buildings
of historical sign-ficance that were originally marked for
demolition.
Although the project definition was essentially sealed
prior to the impact assessment the final design did respond
to public comments. Considering the long and complex
history, public participation came very late in the process.
The formal impact assessment process contributed to
learning for both the public and the lead agency. The public
learned that they can initiate and participate in a
constructive dialogue with a lead agency, in this case, the
state government. They also learned that the impact
assessment process is just one forum for influencing
government action. The state government, particularly the
DAS and BPW learned that by working with the public the
definition of a project can be shaped to meet the interests
of all parties.
Big River Reservoir, Rhode Island. In 1966., the Rhode
Island Water Resources Board (WRB), a quasi-public agency,
purchased 13,0)00 acres of land along the Big and Wood Rivers
in north central Rhode Island to build a reservoir. The
reservoir was intended to meet the state's projected water
supply needs through the year 2030.
The $7.5 million used to buy the land and the additional
$50),C))0 for design and feasibility studies for the reservoir
came from bonds that were passed by voters state-wide.
During the mid-70's additional bonds were rejected by the
state's voters.
In 1978, Governor Garrahy was becoming concerned about
the uncertainty of future funding for the reservoir. He
contacted the COE and asked them to consider taking over the
design and construction of the reservoir.
COE accepted this invitation although they were more
interested in building a flood control project than a
reservoir. Also in 1978, Congress authorized the Pawcatuck
River and Naragansett Bay Study (PNB) to examine the
feasibility of flood control improvements along the Pawcatuck
and Pawtuxet Rivers. The WRB's proposed Big River Reservoir
is located in the Pawtuxet River Basin. In an attempt to
meld their interests in flood control and the WRB's in water
supply, the COE began to study and design a multi-use
reservoir for flood control, water supply, and recreation.
The study area for the Big River Reservoir includes
approximately 450 square miles. The reservoir, itself, would
occupy 3,400 acres and would inundate 3,154 acres of
terrestrial habitat. The area that would be flooded includes
2,305 acres of forest, 524 acres of wetlands, and 325 acres of
open land, 45 acres of streams (19.7 miles) and 10 small
ponds.
In 1978., faculty members at the University of Rhode
Island (URI) Community Planning and Area Development program
proposed to manage the public participation component of the
COE's feasibility study of the Big River Reservoir. URI's
objectives were to provide information and to facilitiate
public input during the process rather than rely solely on
the traditional public hearings.
The consensus of the workshops was that the public had
not been convinced that the state's needs warranted this
monumental water supply project. People were concerned that
outdated population projections had been used to justify the
reservoir. They claimed that the state's population had
been showing a reduced growth rate since the initial
feasibility studies were done. Although participants felt
that the workshops had been informative they criticized the
WRB and COE for not adequately addressing their main concern
that the project had not been justified.
Despite the public's objections to the project, the COE
completed the EIS (which appeared as an addendum to the
feasibility study) and sent it to their federal review arm in
Washington, the Board of Rivers and Harbors. The Board
approved the project. At this writing, COE is waiting for
Congress to authorize the funding for the multi-use
reservoir. Negotiations between the WRB and other state
agencies are in progress to determine who will finance the
remainder of the project, and manage it upon completion.
The case of the Big River Reservoir shows how the
public's attention turns away from technical issues when they
strongly disagree with the project definition. The public
also learned that although workshops are informative, the
lead agency is not obligated to formally acknowledge their
concerns.
Bay Y/iew Towers. Hul .L Massachusetts. For over twenty years
the town of Hull has been trying to attract development to
revitalize its depressed economy. A smaller prototype of
Cape Cod, Hull is located on a 7 1/2 mile barrier beach
jutting out from the southern shoreline of Massachusetts Bay.
In 1979, the Hull Redevelopment Authority (HRA) signed a
contract with Consultants, Inc. to develop a 33 acre parcel
along Nantasket Beach to meet local housing needs. The first
phase of this project included an 11-story apartment building
for the elderly and handicapped. The profitability of the
development hinged on Consultants, Inc.'s ability to win
financial assistance from the U.S. Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD).
One year prior to this proposal, a major blizzard had
hit Massachusetts. In the wake of the blizzard, the state
spent $180 million to ameliorate coastal damage, particularly
along barrier beaches. In 1980, Governor King issued
Executive Order 181 directing all state agencies to adopt
specific policies to reduce the potential for future storm
damage on Massachusetts' barrier beaches. The Massachusetts
Coastal Zone Management Agency (CZM) was named the
coordinating agency of this executive order.
CZM also has the authority to deny any federally funded
project which is "inconsistent" with its goals. Therefore,
before HUD could finance this project CZM had to issue a
certificate of federal consistency. In addition, since
development of this site required coastal wetlands to be
filled Consultants, Inc. needed a license from the Corps of
Engineers (COE). The issuance of this license was also
dependent on CZM's finding of federal consistency.
In 1980, with a Superceding Order of Conditions, the
Massachusetts Department of Environmental Quality Engineering
(DEQE) froze local approvals and ordered all work to be
stopped until until the project was reviewed under the
Wetlands Protection Act. The Wetlands Protection Act
prevents the destruction of salt marshes and clamflats.
In response to the Superceding Order of Conditions
Consultants, Inc. filed an Environmental Notification Form
(ENF) with the Executive Office of Environmental Affairs
(EOEA) describing the project and its impacts to the salt
marsh and clam flats. Upon review of the ENF, EOEA ordered
that the salt marsh could not be filled unless Consultants,
Inc. provided long-term off-site compensation, i.e. moving
and establishing the salt marsh at another location. As a
prerequisite to the implementation of the compensation plan,
Consultants, Inc. had to receive a variance from the Wetlands
Protection Act.
The decision to grant a variance from the Wetlands
Protection Act was determined in an adjudicatory hearing.
Prior to the hearing, Consultants, Inc. prepared a mitigation
plan to relocate 7,500 square feet of salt marsh and 57
bushels of clams. Additionally, the building design included
features to ensure the safety of the tenants. During this
time, public opposition was expressed through a letter
writing campaign. Organized by the Massachusetts Association
of Conservation Commissions (MACC) letters were written to
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Senator Kennedy, Governor King, HUD and COE impressing upon
them the long term costs of barrier beach development and the
risks to the prospective elderly and handicapped tenants.
The hearing officer ultimately decided that the salt
marsh and clam flats could be relocated and by leaving the
first floor of the building unoccupied the tenants' safety
was insured. In 1981, a variance to the Wetlands Protection
Act was granted. The variance was contingent, however, on a
grading and drainage plan that would prevent the proposed
building from aggravating flood conditions for adjacent
buildings. One year later, a Supplementary final decision
approved this plan.
For more than a year Consultants Inc. worked with DEQE,
CZM, HUD, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
on the details of the flood prevention element. During the
course of this work attention turned to the absence of a plan
to evacuate tenants in the event of a 100 year storm. At this
point, MACC threatened to sue HUD if mortgage insurance was
granted to a project that would endanger the elderly and
handicapped tenants. The Conservation Law Foundation of New
England, Inc. (CLF) actually filed suit against HUD for
failing to abide by a Presidential Executive Order mandating
limited federal involvement in the development of wetlands.
Consequently, HUD denied the mortgage insurance, which was
fundamental to the viability of this project.
When Consultants, Inc. sought state funding as an
alternative to federal funding EOEA informed Consultants Inc.
that the receipt of state money would subject this project to
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the Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act (MEPA). If the
project were to fall under MEPA, an Environmental Impact
Report would be required and, in effect, initiate a second,
and independent review process.
At about the same time, the controversey of this project
was having a major affect on local politics. At a town
meeting, the Selectmen fired the entire HRA. The site was
later rezoned to permit nothing higher than forty feet. In
response, Consultant , Inc. sued the town of Hull. At this
writing, the lawsuit is pending.
The Bay View Towers proposal illustrates the problems
that can ensue when a project is defined without considering
the environmental attributes of the site and regulatory
requirements. Although the public did not directly
participate in the review of this project, the letter writing
campaigns and the actual and threatened lawsuits informed the
decision making process.
Siting of Wastewater Treatment Facilities in Boston Harbor.,
Massachusetts. Boston Harbor, dotted with islands formed
during the last ice age is the largest seaport in New
England. Encompassing a total of 50 square miles with 180
miles of shoreline, the Harbor supports commercial and
recreational activities. Its periphery is densely settled
with residential and industrial uses.
Sanitary and storm sewage from the entire Greater Boston
Area is discharged after, and sometimes before, primary
treatment at the Deer and Nut Island Treatment Facilities.
Like many older cities, Boston has combined sanitary and
storm sewers. During heavy rains peak storm water flow
extends the system beyond capacity and raw sewage is dumped
into the Harbor. Untreated sewage is also discharged due to
ordinary equipment failures. The discharge of treated and
untreated sewage from these facilities is directly linked to
the progressive degradation of water quality in the Harbor.
The Nut Island facility was built in 1952 on a 12 acre
site that extends from the town of Quincy into Boston Harbor.
The Deer Island facility was built in 1968 and abuts the town
of Winthrop on a 210 acre site. Deer Island, also houses a
regional correctional facility and is in close proximity to
Logan International Airport. Both Deer and Nut Island
facilities were technologically obsolete and sized under
capacity from the outset. The need to improve sewage
treatment facilities in Boston is a longstanding problem that
is yet to be resolved.
In 1977, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) began
preparation of a DEIS for improved waste water management.
This work was postponed following the 1978 Amendments to the
Clean Water Act requiring all municipal sewage treatment
facilities to be upgraded in order to provide secondary
treatment.
The Metropolitan District Commission (MDC) is
responsible for water and sewage management in the Greater
Boston Area. In 1979, the MDC applied for a waiver from the
Clean Water Act Amendments. After a four year review
process, EPA denied the waiver, and in effect, mandated the
MDC to meet the secondary treatment requirement.
During the review of MDC's application three law suits
were filed. The city of Quincy sued the MDC for polluting
its waters and beaches with raw or partially treated sewage
from the malfunctioning Nut Island treatment plant. EPA
filed suit against the MDC for violating the Clean Water Act
because of its failure to properly monitor sewage discharge.
The Conservation Law Foundation (CLF) sued the EPA for its
failure to insist that the Clean Water Act be observed and
the Harbor be cleaned up.
With these lawsuits pending, the EPA and the MDC began
joint preparation of a Draft EIS/EIR. Since this document
was considered to be an extension of the 1977 DEIS, it is
called a Supplemental DEIS/DEIR (SDEIS/DEIR).
The SDEIS/DEIR addresses one issue; the siting of a new
wastewater treatment facility. The sites under active
consideration are Deer Island, Nut Island, and Long Island.
The state and federal agencies involved in the preparation of
the document decided that the siting decision should be
independent of other considerations such as sludge management
and mitigation measures. Apparently, they thought this
segmentation would expedite the process and allow them to
proceed with efforts to clean up the Harbor. Instead they
have been criticized by the public for irrationally
segmenting the assessment of impacts and refusing to address
issues that are fundamental to a siting decision.
The scoping phase of this process included the creation
of a Technical Advisory Group (TAG) which includes state and
federal agencies and a Citizens Advisory Group (CAC) that is
made up of a broad spectrum of interested citizens from the
area. The two groups met separately and together to review
work on the SDEIS/DEIR. TAG and CAC have met with EPA and
its consultants to discuss issues of concern to them.
Workshops were also held to further inform the public.
The public comment period for the SDEIS/DEIR ended in
March, 1985. A siting decision for a secondary treatment
facility will be made by the newly created Massachusetts
Water Resources Authority (MWRA) in July of 1985. It is
expected that a final EIS will be issued shortly thereafter.
Siting a new wastewater treatment facility in Boston
Harbor is an example of a project that has been narrowly
defined to hasten the amelioration of a severe water quality
and waste management problem. Even with the formally
recognized CAC, the public is unable to affect the
segmentation of the impact assessment process. In response
to the public's demands for technical information, the lead
agencies say that those issues are irrelevant to the siting
decision.
Extension of Interstate 93 through Franconia Notch. New
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Hamgshire. Since 1958 the New Hampshire Department of
Public Works and Highways (DPWH) has planned to extend
Interstate 93 (1-93) through the White Mountains. The long
history of this project is characterized by considerable
public debate, a U.S. Court injunction enjoining
construction, and ultimately, a negotiated agreement among
DPWH and private organizations that opposed the extension of
1-93 as defined by the DPWH.
Franconia Notch State Park is located in the White
Mountain National Forest in New Hampshire. Natural wonders,
such as the gorge-cutting streams of the "Flume" and the
granite ledge face of the "Old Man of the Mountain"
contribute to the uniqueness of the area. The Forest is the
largest area of public land in New England, attracting
hikers, skiiers, campers, and sightseers year-round. The
regional economy is heavily dependent on spinoff from
visitation to the Park. Prior to the proposal to extend 1-93
through Franconia Notch, U.S. Route 3 provided the only
access to this picturesque environment. It was generally
accepted that the winding, undivided 2-lane rural highway
with deteriorated, or non-existent shoulders, was inadequate
to serve the Park's 3 million annual visitors.
Connecting Massachusetts and Vermont, the section of I-
93 through New Hampshire was designed as three distinct
segments. From north to south the segments are; Campton to
Lincoln, through Franconia Notch and the White Mountains, and
Littelton to Waterford, Vermont. DPWH's plans were developed
in near seclusion from other agencies and the public. Even
the state Forestry and Recreation Commission first became
aware of the proposal when DPWH began to take bids for
construction.
As early as 1958, the Appalachian Mountain Club (AMC)
and other environmental and citizen groups expressed concern
about the impact of the proposed highway on the unique and
publicly valued qualities of the area. Although U.S. Route 3
already existed through the Notch, it was a narrow,
unobtrusive road and qualitatively different than the four-
lane highspeed highway that typifies the Interstate system.
In 1959, the New Hampshire legislature authorized DPWH
to proceed with construction through Franconia Notch.
Starting with the southern segment 1-93 began to approach
Franconia Notch in 1966. The DPWH also constructed portions
of the northern segment around this time. Concerned
environmental and citizen groups protested this fragmented
approach. They claimed that the construction of the northern
and southern parts of 1-93 was an inappropriate means to
secure construction of the segment through Franconia Notch.
Since DPWH received funding from the U. S. Federal
Highway Administration (FHA) the extension of 1-93 was
subject to NEPA. In 1974, DPWH prepared a draft EIS for the
Franconia Notch section. A separate EIS was prepared for
the northern segment, while the southern segment had already
been constructed.
In 1975, AMC and the Society for the Preservation of
New Hampshire Forests (SPNHF) won a court-ordered injunction
halting further action on the northern segment until the
exact location and design of the Franconia Notch segment was
resolved.
The DEIS on Franconia Notch took nearly two years to
complete. While the DPWH insisted on focusing the analysis
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on the location of the transportation corridor, the public
wanted to discuss the specific road design, i.e. two or four
lanes, and interstate or parkway. After the public comment
period DPWH chose the interstate design through Franconia
Notch. The public adamantly opposed this particular design
and suggested an alternative proposal. They proposed a two-
lane, low speed parkway with enhanced visitor access, traffic
management, and park facility improvements. Environmental
groups, state and federal agencies supported this proposal.
The conflict was heightening when a state representative
of New Hampshire suggested that the parties come together to
negotiate an agreement. The AMC was willing to join this
effort because they thought they could use it as a forum to
win general improvements for the Park. State and federal
agencies realized that without an agreement imminent
litigation could postpone the project indefinitely.
After several months of negotiation the parties agreed
to a two lane parkway through Franconia Notch with
improvements to the Park. The outcome of the negotiation
substantially informed the preparation of the FEIS. The
parties agreed to link the construction of the northern segment
to the approval of the FEIS. Construction through Franconia
Notch began in 1984. The AMC and other parties to this
legally-binding agreement are actively monitoring
construction to ensure environmental impacts are minimized.
Despite the fact that the project was narrowly defined,
a negotiation helped to reshape the definition until the
interests of all parties had been met. This case illustrates
a novel approach to resolving disputes that emerge through
the impact assessment process. Government agencies and
environmental organizations learned that even when needs may
seem mutually exclusive creative solutions can be identified.
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Pyramid MallL Chittendon County. Vermont. In 1977, the
Pyramid Company of Burlington applied for a permit under
Vermont's Land use and Development Act to build an enclosed
regional shopping mall in Chittendon County. The site is
located in the town of Williston which is characterized as a
"quiet, rural community" and is just six miles from downtown
Burlington.
The Land Use and Development Act, also known as Act 250,
applies to all development proposals that involve at least
ten acres of land. The Pyramid Mall, which was envisioned to
occupy more than 90 acres of a 200 acre site clearly fell
within the purview of this law. The District Commission took
more than a year to review the Pyramid Company's application
and supporting evidence. The applicant, state and local
planning bodies, citizen groups, and adjoining landowners
were statutory parties to this process. Represented by their
lawyers, they gave testimony and were cross examined during
the course of 43 public hearings.
In 1978, District Commission #4 stood up to the
politically charged debate and denied the Company's
application for a permit. The application was rejected
because it failed to meet several of the criteria that are
established in Act 250. The District Commission found that
the Pyramid Mall would cause undue highway congestion, burden
the local government's ability to provide services, burden
private utility's delivery of services, and result in undue
public costs from scattered development. Additionally, the
proposal lacked conformance with the local, regional and
state Capability and Development Plans.
The Commission justified its decision to deny the permit
with a general set of concerns regarding negative economic
impacts on Burlington's central business district and the
city's tax structure, negative impacts to the rural character
of the region, and the burden on Chittendon County's
municipal services. The importance of these issues to the
residents and local officials heated the public debate
surrounding the review of Pyramid's application.
The Pyramid application was denied by the District
Commission in October of 1978. Since permits are usually
granted by the Commission, the decision to deny the Pyramid
Company's application represented an exception to the typical
review. (From 1970 to 1980, of the 3,740 permits that were
acted upon only 95 were denied.) Since then, the Pyramid
Company has been unsuccessful in several appeals and has not
exhibited any recent interest in reviving the proposal.
In the aftermath of the District Commission's decision
to deny the Pyramid Company's application for a permit,
Burlington's Revitalization Program, although initiated
almost 20 years ago, has been noticeably more active. The
City has made an effort to enhance the attractiveness of the
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commercial center through the Church Street Market Place.
This outdoor shopping mall is an example of the recent urban
phenomenon of the "festival market place." The City has also
secured federal funding to build a 500-space garage and to
provide additional rooms and meeting space at the centrally-
located Radisson Hotel.
Today, seven years after the denial of the Pyramid
Company's request for an Act 250 permit, that decision and
review process is still fresh in the minds of many
Vermonters. The denial of this application is a landmark in
Act 250's 15-year history.
Because Act 250 is based in a permit process, projects
will necessarily be clearly defined by the time the proponent
submits an application. The long review process for this
permit showed that Act 250 is flexible enough to accomodate
an application that is supported by a wealth of technical
information. The public had access to this process, both as
statutory parties and observers. Participants in this
process learned that Act 250 is capable of giving a thorough
review to complex and controversial proposals.
Dickey-Lincoln School Lakes Proect. Aroostook County
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Maine. The Dickey-Lincoln School Lakes project evolved from
studies on the potential development of tidal power
facilities at Passamaquoddy Bays dating back to the early
1900s.
In 1963, the Department of the Interior (DOI) determined
that the Passamaquoddy project could be justified if it were
designed to provide peak, rather than base load power for the
area encompassing New England, Upstate New York, New
Brunswick and Nova Scotia. One site that was studied for
hydropower development was at Rankin Rapids on the Allagash
River. This proposal was eventually rejected because of the
adverse environmental impacts to the Allagash River. Two
alternative sites on the nearby St. John River, at Dickey and
Lincoln Schools, became prime candidates for a large scale
hydropower project. In the mid 1960's the Passamaquoddy
element was dropped. The Dickey-Lincoln School Lakes Project
was sited and planned on the upper St. John River in a
remote, thinly populated corner of Aroostook County in
northern Maine.
As proposed, this project consisted of two
interdependent dams. The Dickey Dam is located immediately
above the confluence of the St. John and Allagash Rivers,
near the village of Dickey. The dam would impound a
reservoir with a gross storage capacity of 7.7 million acre-
feet for power and flood control. About 260 miles of
streams, including 55 miles of the St. John River would be
flooded to create the reservoir. Electric power generating
facilities would provide a total installed capacity of 760
Megawatts (Mw) per year.
The site for the Lincoln School Dam is in the town of
St. Francis. It would impound 67,150 acre-feet. The
Lincoln-School Dam was proposed to counter the problem of
extreme fluctuations in river flow caused by the intermittant
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peak power operations of Dickey's power plant. It would
serve as a reservoir to regulate releases from the Dickey Dam
and for use as power pondage. The Lincoln-School power
facility would have a total installed capacity of 70 Mw/year.
The Dickey Dam would provide electricity to all of New
England. The reservoir would require almost 1 3 0 ,
0 0 0 acres.
The Lincoln Dam would generate power exclusively for Maine,
and would require 3000 acres. The proposed project was
massive. It was planned as the largest public works project
ever undertaken in New England.
Although the Dickey-Lincoln School project was going to
be built by the COE, the main proponents of the project were
Senators Muskie and Mitchell. They viewed the project as
necessary to meet the energy needs of the region.
Opponents of the project included the Maine Natural
Resource Council (NRC), summer residents, environmentalists,
hunters and fishers. They criticized the Senators for being
insensitive to the environmental impacts suggested by this
proposal. The Senators, based in Washington, D.C. , did not
display any direct knowledge of the beauty of the area or why
it is valued by so many people.
In 1978, a DEIS was produced by the COE. They sent the
DEIS to the Chief Engineers in Washington for review. The
review found that the DEIS had not adequately addressed
several issues, including electricity rates, benefits to the
state, and impacts to wildlife. In order to remedy these
inadequacies COE contracted with other agencies and firms to
prepare the assessment on specific topics. This effort
substantially improved the information and as a result,
pointed out fundamental problems with the proposal.
The outcome of these studies appeared in the form of
revised and supplemental revised DEISs. These documents made
new information available and spurred public outcry against
this project. The new information convinced EPA, DOI, and
NRC that the project was unsound. As a result, Congress
deauthorized the funding for the Dickey Dam. Although the
Lincoln Dam was not deauthorized, it is unlikely that it
would be constructed without the Dickey Dam.
The impact assessment for the Dickey-Lincoln School Dam
proposal illustrates how technical information is used to
inform decision makers about an environmentally damaging
project. COE learned that a superficial analysis that
appears to minimize impacts does not guarantee that the proposal
will be approved.
Themes from Case Studies
The purpose of impact assessment is to guide decision
making. As an informational process impact assessment is
supposed to contribute to project definition. As a process,
it brings together fragmented analyses into a coherent
framework that is supplemented with public comments.
Technical analysis and public criticism are intended to serve
as resources to decision makers and direct them to make wise
and sound decisions. A decision made after such a synthetic
and public oriented process, the theory goes, will protect
environmental quality and promote the public interest.
Now, if all decisions that succeeded impact assessment
processes were made in this public-spirited and future
oriented manner we would, in effect, have NEPA and SEPAs,
functioning precisely the way they were intended. In other
words, the practice would be consistent with the theory. But
from this small sample, alone, it is obvious that the
connection between theory and practice, or impact assessment
and decision making is not always made.
After a careful review of the case studies four dominant
themes emerged. The themes that are continually illustrated
by the case studies are:
(1) Project Definition. Impact assessment does not always
play as much of a role in the early planning stages as was
originally intended. Lead agencies tend to narrowly define
their objectives and then, from their perspective, a narrowly
defined project follows. By the time this information
reaches the publics' ears the project is beyond the planning
stages.
(2) Technical Information. Technical information should
inform the impact assessment of a proposal. Instead, it
either supports the proposal, because it is prepared by the
proponent (who is understandably biased), or is secondary to
the process because the public (and sometimes other agencies)
have more fundamental questions regarding the project
definition.
(3) Public Participation. One of the founding ideas of
impact assessment is that it institutionalize a process
whereby the public can have informational access to the
assessment of a proposal, and have a formal opportunity to
comment on the proposal and the impact assessment.~ The role
that the public plays depends on legal mandates, the agency's
attitude, and the public's resources. The standard formal
hearing can be a frustrating experience for the public.
Workshops are useful, but the agency is not obligated to
abide by them. Few agencies will initiate the workshops
themselves, but they do respond when they are suggested by an
interested party.
(4) Learning. There is the potential for both the public
and the lead agency to learn from impact assessment.
Although parties may learn to act effectively within the
process, it is doubtful whether learning carries over to the
next impact assessment process.
The cases will be referred to by abbreviated titles:
Criminal Court Facility, CT - Court Facility
Big River Reservoir, RI - Big River
Bay View Towers, Hull, MA - Bay View
Siting Wastewater Facilities, MA - Boston Harbor
Pyramid Mall, VT - Pyramid Mall
1-93 through Franconia Notch, NH - Franconia Notch
Dickey-Lincoln School Dam, ME - Dickey-Lincoln
Project Definition. Typically, impact assessment is required
to be conducted early enough in the planning process so the
project definition can respond to the findings. The
objective is to contribute to the design of a proposal that
will minimize environmental impact. Impact assessment was
institutionalized to force agencies to "look before they
leap". Contrary to this desired sequence of events, the
cases show that most agencies are still making the decision
to leap first and then do various degrees of "looking" after
the decision has been made. This conclusion suggests that
impact assessment is not fulfilling the visions of its
creators.
Collectively, the cases show that lead agencies define
their objectives so narrowly that only a similarly narrow
project definition can meet them. In the case of the Big
River Reservoir, the Water Resource Board (WRB) defined their
objective as developing a major water supply system to meet
projected water demands based on a constant upward growth in
population. The project that met this objective, was defined
as a new reservoir. Environmental and citizen groups
contested both the objective, claiming that population growth
trends had been considerably below the projections, and the
project definition saying that conservation and groundwater
supplies were reasonable alternatives to meet the same
objective.
The Court Facility was also characterized by a rigidly
defined objective and project definition. The State Judicial
Department maintained an intractable position that new court
facilities were needed because the existing facilities were
overcrowded and could not provide adequate security. The
project was defined, primarily, by the fact that the Judicial
Department owned a large parcel of land, contiguous on one
side with the existing court house. The public objected to
this project definition because the site also bordered on
residential and historic districts. Because the objectives
and project definition were so narrowly construed, the
Judicial Department was only willing to discuss minor design
modifications to the project. In fact, the only alternative
that was given any mention in the Environmental Impact
Evaluation (EIE) was the "no-build" option. As an
alternative, "no-build" was quickly dismissed because it did
not meet the objectives.
Rigidly defined projects also tend to inhibit the lead
agency's consideration of creative solutions that could meet
their objectives. Two cases illustrate this point; Boston
Harbor and Franconia Notch.
Since the objectives in Boston Harbor have been
construed in terms of the need for one treatment facility to
manage sanitary and storm wastewater for the region the
consideration of creative and potentially less objectionable
alternatives have been precluded. The communities of Quincy
and Winthrop, one of which will serve as host to the new
facility, are vehemently opposed to bearing the health,
economic and aesthetic burdens for the entire region.
The project proponents, the EPA and MDC, under the
pressure of several law suits are convinced that adhering to
the centralized regional facility is the most expeditious way
to bring the pollution of the Harbor under control. In this
race, they refuse to consider decentralized or "satellite"
treatment facilities, ways to reduce peak storm water flows
(which are frequently the cause of overflows and the
discharge of untreated sewage into the Harbor) or creating a
new island on which to locate the facility. The proponents
may concede that there is merit to the alternatives, however,
having spent years trying to remedy the abhorrent water
quality problem it is too late to reconsider some of the
alternatives that were ruled out at a much earlier date.
Franconia Notch provides a refreshing example of a case
that was initially characterized by narrowly defined
objectives (extension of 1-93 through Franconia Notch) and
project definition (a 4-lane highway). Through the process
of a negotiation that brought the disputing parties together
a creative solution was reached through consensus.
The outcome of the negotiation profoundly influenced the
project definition, while still meeting the interests of all
parties. From DPWH's perspective the extension of 1-93
through Franconia Notch was a key part of the larger segment
of 1-93 that runs through New Hampshire. Because AMC and
their supporters had so adamantly argued that the unique
qualities of the Park should be protected, they won an
injunction halting construction on the northern third of the
Interstate. Therefore, DPWH not only wanted to improve the
existing road through Franconia Notch, but they also wanted
to insure that 1-93 ran continuously through New Hampshire.
AMC, on the other hand wanted to protect the unique qualities
of the Park and improve visitor amenities.
The project definition that was reached through the
negotiation and which met the interests of all parties was a
4-lane divided interstate to the north and south of Franconia
Notch. The road progressively narrows to 2-lanes through
more sensitive portions of the Notch. The agreement also
gave the AMC a formal role to monitor construction activities
through the Notch in order to insure that environmental
impacts are minimized.
Another case that illustrates a narrowly defined
objective and project is the Pyramid Mall case. This case
differs from Big River, Boston Harborand Franconia Notch
because the project proponent was a private developer and the
proposal received a thorough review from the outset.
Although the application for the Act 250 permit was denied,
the project definition did respond to the evaluation of
forecasted impacts.
It is the Act 250 permit process, itself, that sets the
Pyramid Mall case apart from the others. Act 250 defines
"statutory" parties to each permit review which include; the
applicant, regional, state, and local agencies, adjoining
land owners and other parties that may be admitted at the
discretion of the District Commission.
In part because of the nature of private development
companies, and in part due to the structure of a permit
process, the Pyramid Company presented a completed project
for review under Act 250. Following a judicial model, the
District Commission heard testimony and evidence from all
statutory parties and their expert witnesses. The Commission
then had to synthesize and balance the arguments of all
statutory parties. In the process of this review, the
Pyramid Company modified the project definition although the
permit was ultimately denied. The unique review process of
Act 250 allowed the Commission to look before they allowed
the Pyramid Company to leap.
Reflecting on the cases of the Court Facility, Big
River, Boston Harbor, Franconia Notch, and Pyramid Mall in
terms of project definition several conclusions emerge.
First, agencies perceive their objectives within a very
narrow context and project are defined accordingly. Second,
agencies are apprehensive to consider alternatives and
creative solutions because they anticipate that it will slow
the process or diminish their control of the project. Third,
a review process that invites discordant analyses and
balances them is more likely to result in a thorough analysis
even when the project has been very narrowly defined.
Technical Information. The role and degree to which
technical information affected the impact assessment process
in the cases varied. The case studies show that the debate
concerning the quality of technical information and analysis
was subordinate to the public's acceptance of the project
definition. Most of the projects that form the basis of the
case studies involved large-scale development proposals. As
a result of the size and complexity of these projects, their
respective proponents tended to produce a wealth of technical
information. Although in most cases this information was
circulated, when the project definition was controversial
little attention was given to the analysis.
In the case of Big River, the public was primarily
concerned with how the WRB had defined the project, i.e.
building a massive reservoir to provide water for Rhode
Island through 2030. Members of the URI's Community Planning
and Area Development program conducted a series of public
workshops. The purpose of the workshops was to inform the
public and identify their concerns. The issues raised and
their order of importance illustrates that technical
information was secondary since the merits of the project
were publicly suspect. Of the five areas of concern that
were raised, the first and most important was "needs
assessment." The public wanted a justification for this
seemingly unnecessary project. Second on the list of
concerns was that other alternatives should be more fully
explored. Environmental, social, and economic impacts, which
are typically addressed with technical analytical tools were
fifth on the list.
The COE was primarily responsible for the planning and
design of the Big River Reservoir. Since the viability of
this project was dependent on Congressional appropriation of
funds there was little incentive to be accountable to public
concerns.
The Court Facility also illustrates the minor role that
technical information plays when the project is essentially
predetermined prior to the impact asessment. Although the
Judicial Department responded to community concerns regarding
traffic and parking, noise, and air quality impacts (which
necessarily lend themselves to technical analyses) their
efforts to mitigate these impacts resulted in only minor
changes to the project definition. The technical analysis
was, in fact, used to demonstrate that impacts would be
minor. The public was skeptical of the credibility of the
analysis and remained concerned about the project definition.
An interesting reversal of roles in terms of technical
analysis is seen in the Boston Harbor case. As opposed to
the proponent making a protracted effort to demonstrate the
project's feasibility with technical information, in this
case, the public is requesting technical analysis and the
proponent has refused to produce it.
The lead agencies (EPA and MDC) made the decision to
conduct the impact assessment process for the wastewater
treatment facility as a series of smaller, clearly defined
steps. The SDEIS/EIR that is being prepared by the lead
agencies exclusively address the siting of the facility, as
distinct from the social and environmental impacts of the
facility once it is sited and constructed.
In the case of Boston Harbor, the segmentation of the
impact assessment process has produced an atypical situation
where the public wants more technical analysis than the
proponent is prepared to make available.
The role of technical analysis played an interesting
role in the Dickey-Lincoln case. Public opposition to this
case was initially framed in terms of questioning the
objectives and the justification for this colossal hydropower
project. Regardless of this public sentiment, the COE
proceeded with the design of the dual dam system and produced
a DEIS. The COE submitted the DEIS for review to the Office
of Chief Engineers. The review concluded that the DEIS
failed to adequately address several issues such as
electricity rates, benefits to the state (for providing a
regional service) and impacts to fish and wildlife. In order
to remedy these deficiencies, COE contracted with agencies
who had expertise in these topics. The revised DEIS was so
thorough that it enabled the public to use the technical
analysis as a sound basis for opposition.
The Dickey-Lincoln Dam was initially opposed because of
the general imbalance of state versus regional impacts and
benefits. The revised and improved technical analysis
ultimately convinced Congress of this imbalance. Congress
deauthorized the proposal based on the forecasted impacts.
Technical issues were important in the Bay View case.
Since the site for the highrise was located on a barrier
beach, the developer had to, first, receive a variance from
the Gubernatorial Executive Order protecting barrier beaches.
Technical analysis played a very important role in the
decision to grant the variance. Issues that were addressed
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included whether the salt marsh and clam flats could be
successfully relocated and whether the prospective tenants
(elderly and handicapped) would be endangered during storm
and flood conditions. However, it was not technical issues
that brought this proposal to a halt. General lack of
confidence in an evacuation plan for the tenants eventually
caused HUD to withdraw funding for the project. The
feasibility of the project became increasingly uncertain from
that point.
Perhaps the common theme among the cases in terms of a
diminished role for technical analysis follows from the fact
that these materials are prepared by the project proponent.
The public, perceiving this information as biased in favor of
the proposal has learned not to depend on this information as
a scientific or critical assessment of the project.
Additionally, the cases show that the public tends to be
the only advocate for including the assessment of qualitative
or non-technical issues in the process. In the early stages
of Franconia Notch, environmentalists were trying to convince
DPWH that Franconia Notch is a unique and publicly valued
area. The DPWH barely heard this as they continued to
restate their objective of completing the interstate system
through New Hampshire. Through the course of the negotiation
environmental values were eventually incorporated into the
project definition.
Dickey-Lincoln Dam also highlights the conflict between
quantitative and qualitative concerns. The St. John River,
where the dams would be located, is valued by local and
summer residents, recreationists, and sport hunters and
fishers. As a group, they were annoyed that the Washington-
based proponents, "wouldn't know the front end of a trout
from the back".
As the lead agencies of impact assessment strive to
improve the technical aspects of their analysis, the non-
technical aspects are systematically underemphasized.
Perhaps because these issues do not easily fit into the
traditional language and format of an EIS, project proponents
choose to ignore them. However, as illustrated by Franconia
Notch and Dickey-Lincoln, these are often the most important
issues to the public.
Both technical and non-technical analysis have the
potential to play a more important role in impact assessment.
This role remains limited as long as the public perceives the
analysis as biased or blind to the issues which they consider
to be key.
The preparation of an impact assessment for a project
should include dialogue between the public and the lead
agency in the early planning stages. Lead agencies need to
acknowledge competing value systems when evaluating impacts.
They may find that not only is their project definition
flexible enough to respond, but by addressing non-technical
issues as thoroughly as they do the technical, the public may
be willing to play a cooperative role in the impact
assessment process.
Public Particigation. Impact assessment is not only a device
to study a proposed project and forecast the impacts of a
proposal. It also provides an important source of
information to the public regarding impacts which are of
concern to them. The federal and state mandates typically
require a scoping process (to which the public may or may not
be invited) and a public hearing after the DEIS is written.
The role that the public actually plays in impact assessment
depends in part on the requirements of the impact assessment
legislation, the degree to which the lead agency welcomes the
public, and the public's access to financial resources.
The proposal for Bay View Towers was not reviewed under
an impact assessment process per se. Because the development
of Bay View required filling a salt marsh and relocating
clamflats, DEQE required the developer, to get a variance
from the Gubernatorial Executive Order protecting these
ecosystems. The forum for this variance was an adjudicatory
hearing attended by the developer, CZM, and DEQE. The public
was not involved in this phase of the impact assessment.
The most active public participation was seen after the
developer had managed to jump through the whole complex of
regulatory hoops and financing was the only issue to be
resolved. Lead by the MACC, a letter writing campaign to HUD
impressed on them the ecological damage and public hazard of
this project. Funding was eventually withdrawn. Therefore,
even without a public forum, the public influences the impact
assessment process.
Boston Harbor and the Pyramid Mall are cases where the
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lead agency invited the public into the impact assessment
process. In the Boston Harbor case, the EPA, realizing that
siting a wastewater treatment facility was a regionally
controversial issue hired Barry Lawson Associates (BLA) to
coordinate the public partiicpation program. The program
included the creation and facilitation of a Citizens Advisory
Committee (CAC). The CAC was composed of representatives
from Quincy and Winthrop, environmental groups, industry and
individual citizens. In addition to their own meetings, CAC
has met with the EPA and the Technical Advisory Group (TAG)
which is made up of state and federal agencies.
BLA also coordinated public workshops to facilitate a
focused discussion of the issues posed by this project. A
series of community meetings were held to present work-in-
progress and to explain options under consideration by the
lead agencies.
In this case, EPA took the initiative to provide a forum
for public participation. Information was made available and
interested parties could get direct answers to their
questions. Officials have been impressed with the level of
sophistication and the constructive attitude with which the
public has brought to this impact assessment process.
Similarly, the Pyramid Mall case, as a result of Act
250's automatic inclusion of statutory parties, yr Avau U
direct access to elected and appointed officials, private
organizations, and citizens. In this case, all parties
presented information and gave testimony, all of which became
part of the formal record. Through the hearings, the parties
had access to the same information and could publicly and
formally contest each others' findings. Additionally, the
hearings were always open to the general public.
The generous invitation to the public that was seen in
the Pyramid Mall case is an institution of Act 250. Although
the Boston Harbor case has a public participation component,
it was a created at the discretion of EPA. True, CAC has
access to information and key actors, the degree to which
they will actually influence the siting decision remains to
be seen.
The Court Facility, Big River, and Franconia Notch are
cases where the lead agency was not particularly interested
in involving the public but they (eventually) responded to
external suggestions that they should provide a forum for
public debate.
Connecticut's Judicial Department was approaching the
final design phase of the Court Facility after a twenty-year
history. The Hartford Architectural Conservancy (HAC),
concerned about the imminent demolition of several buildings
within the Frog Hollow Historic District, voiced their
concerns and the concerns of the abutting residents to the
state. HAC suggested that the state sponsor a public
workshop. In the workshop, the public recommended design
modifications that would leave certain buildings in tact and
respect the residential character of the area. The public
knew the role they could play was limited since the project
had already been very narrowly defined. However, the
mitigative measures that were identified through the workshop
were incorporated into the project definition.
In Big River, the graduate program in Community Planning
and Development at URI submitted a proposal to the COE to
design and conduct the public participation.component of the
feasibility study. The first phase of this program included
three workshops to identify major issues and to facilitate
the discussion of these concerns. The second phase reviewed
the preliminary plans and the DEIS. Despite URI's good
intentions, there are no indications that the public
workshops had any bearing on the proposal or decision to
proceed with the project.
DPWH, the proponent of the Franconia Notch case, was not
responsive to the public's request for access to the process
until a court-ordered injunction had stopped construction on
part of the project and New Hampshire Representative
Cleveland appointed Administrative Aide Joslin to facilitate
a negotiated agreement to this mounting dispute. In the end,
the negotiation was successful and a consensual agreement was
reached. The agreement became the basis for a legally
binding and enforceable memorandum of understanding.
The Court Facility, Big River, and Franconia Notch
illustrate public participation components that became part
of the process despite the proponent s reluctance. The Court
Facility and Franconia Notch are two cases where these
efforts were successful; the Court Facility within limited
bounds, and Franconia Notch through a far-reaching and
enforceable agreement.
The public's access to resources can affect the degree
to which they can influence an impact assessment process. In
the case of Franconia Notch, the AMC and SPNHF, each with a
large membership pool from which to draw both support and
funds were able to bring suit against the DPWH. Similarly in
Boston Harbor, the city of Quincy was able to mobilize and
raise funds that were necessary to sue the MDC for polluting
the Harbor. In the Court Facility case, the residents did
not have access to the kind of resources that would be
required to either bring suit or hire their own consultants.
Instead, through Hartford Area Rally Together (HART) an
umbrella block club organization, they began to work with the
city to protect their neighborhood by downzoning the
residential-office zone to exclusively residential.
Time and money are important resources when the public
is trying to get involved in a process for which they have
received no invitation. When the public has the resources
they tend to turn to litigation although there are other
channels that may be more efficient in terms of resources and
meeting their interests.
The majority of cases illustrate that when the public is
able to make substantive comments about a proposal they
command the respect and attention of the lead agency.
Slowly, lead agencies are finding that substantive comments
by the public can help to improve the project definition and
produce a stable outcome. The traditional view has been to
keep public participation to a minimum lest the agency lose
control of the project. Lately, they have been more willing
to give the public a real role when the process is managed
and facilitated by professionals. This phenomenon is seen in
Boston Harbor (BLA), Franconia Notch (Administrative Aid
Joslin), and Big River (URI).
All of the cases, with the exception of Bay View and
Pyramid Mall (and their particular review processes) were
characterized by public workshops. In general, these
workshops were used to present and discuss the project
definition, and to discuss the views and interests of the
public and proponent. Across the cases people found
workshops to be useful and an important source of
information. Comparatively, formal public hearings were
considered to be frustrating and intimidating.
Since the public is.affected by the proposals reviewed
under impact assessment process they should have a voice in
the design and outcome of the proposal. Government has a
history of being uncomfortable with public participation.
They seem to fear that opening the process to the public will
challenge their role as the lead agency.
Lately, lead agencies have been becoming more responsive
to suggestions from outside their office to conduct
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cases, lead agencies are repeatedly impressed with the
serious attitudes and constructive comments that characterize
the public's participation.
When people are given a genuine role in the impact
assessment process they are more likely to perceive the
process as legitimate. Lead agencies should view the public
as as an informational resource. They can provide important
information based on their interests, values, and familiarity
with the area. Their participation can lend legitimacy to
the process, i.e. that it was conducted in a fair and open
manner. Finally, public participation is important to a
long-term stable outcome of the impact assessment process.
Learning. In a retrospective analysis of impact assessment
it is important to ask whether government, at the state and
federal level, private organizations, and individual citizens
are "learning" from their experiences with impact assessment.
This question needs to address whether the experience of
having been involved in an impact assessment process leads to
better impact assessment in the future. This experience
should enhance effective public action and produce decisions
which are perceived as wise, legitimate and sound. Ideally,
learning should occur within a particular impact assessment
process, and this new knowledge should extend to the next
process.
Reflecting on the array of cases considered here the
majority of them have been characterized by learning. There
is no apparent correlation between the year in which the
impact assessment was conducted or whether it was a state or
federal mandate that required the impact assessment. The
cases which provide the most illustrative examples of
learning are; Franconia Notch, Court Facility, Dickey-Lincoln
and Pyramid Mall.
The enviromental groups that were involved in Franconia
Notch learned, through their dedication to preserving the
environmental qualities of Franconia Notch, that they were
able to shape the outcome of the process. They organized
public support and refused to be excluded from the impact
assessment process. They learned that litigation was an
effective means to bring the project to a halt and, as a
result, force the DPWH to be accountable. Although their
lawsuit was considered to be a victory, a longer lasting and
perhaps more meaningful experience was gained through their
participation in the negotiation. As a result of the
negotiation they learned that they can work cooperatively
with the lead agency yet still have their interests met.
Also, through the negotiation they were given a formally
recognized role as an enforcer of the agreement.
The DPWH also learned but perhaps more reluctantly. It
was not until after the injunction that DPWH was ready to
listen and respond to the environmental groups' concerns.
Ultimately, their decision to proceed with the extension of
1-93 responded to the impact assessment process. The changes
that were made to the DEIS as a result of the negotiation are
evidenced in the FEIS.
The Court Facility case can also be discussed in terms
of the learning that it fostered. The residents learned to
work with government officials. Even though the range of
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alternatives were limited to design modifications, they
worked to make the project acceptable given these
limitations. Additionally, they learned that they can go
outside of the impact assessment process, i.e. the rezoning
effort, to effectively mitigate the impacts of the project.
The state, particularly the DAS and the BPW (that
oversaw the preparation of the EIE) considered themselves to
be "learning clients" as they made their way through the
requirements of CEPA for the first time. They made an effort
to accomodate the public's concerns, and have since used this
case as a model for other impact assessment processes.
Dickey-Lincoln is an example where Congress' decision to
finally deauthorize the project responded to the impact
assessment process. In general, the public was against the
project and were pleased when Congress decided that it would
no longer receive active consideration. They learned that
technical information can be used to reach a wise decision.
The COE, on the other hand, learned that a superficial
analysis, or one that omits important issues, will not
necessarily lead to the approval of a project simply because
the impacts "appear" to be minor. In this case, it was the
COE's own review arm that pointed out the deficiencies.
The Pyramid Mall case showed the strength of Act 250 and
how communities can use the permit process to provide a
rational basis for protecting economic stability, community
character, and the natural environment. Everyone involved in
this case learned that the Act 250 permit process is flexible
enough to handle complex applications even when they are
controversial and accompanied by a wealth of evidence.
Of the cases that are the basis of this analysis, several can
be discussed in terms of learning on the parts of the public
and the lead agency. Based on the information that was
available during the research phase of this study there is no
evidence that these instances of impact assessment learned
from previous impact assessment processes. The Court Facility
seems to be the only case where these experiences were
applied to other processes. Learning does not seem to extend
beyond the individual case. There is a lot of room for
experiences and knowledge that have been gained to be applied
to future impact assessment processes, and thus, allow the
processes to "learn" from each other.
Conclusions
The value of a retrospective analysis is in the lessons
that can be extracted from it and applied to future actions.
With respect to the analysis of the role of impact assessment
in environmental decision making in New England these lessons
come from the comparison of the ideal model to the real model
as illustrated by the case studies. Returning to the four
themes of project definition, technical information, public
participation, and learning, the case studies show there is a
gap between the ideal and real models.
Ideally, project definition should respond to the impact
assessment process. In practice, however, the project is
usually defined well before impact assessment commences.
Additionally, since projects are essentially defined before
the process begins little attention is given to the
consideration of alternatives. A public workshop held prior
to the scoping process could help to identify other projects
that could meet the lead agency's objectives. A pre-scoping
workshop would, therefore, identify a realistic set of
alternatives and provide a forum for public input in the
early planning stages of the project.
Technical information is important to forecast impacts
and identify mitigation measures, both of which should affect
the project definition. However, when the public has not
been convinced that the project definition is wise they tend
to disregard the technical information. An ongoing dialogue
between the lead agency and the public is necessary to ensure
that the technical analysis adequately addresses the relevant
issues and responds to the public's concerns.
The importance of meaningful public participation in the
impact assessment process can not be overemphasized. One of
the founding ideas of impact assessment is that it should
provide access and information to the public. However, the
conventional public hearing that is held between the Draft
and Final EIS does not give the public an opportunity to ask
questions and have them answered while there is still time to
influence the project. Public workshops serve this function
quite well. Participants in workshops tend to come with
constructive attitudes and they are anxious to express their
interests and concerns. Lead agencies should make full use
of this forum to ensure that the project definition and
technical analysis reflects both their needs and the
publics'.
Finally, if we are to be optimistic about the future of
impact assessment, learning must be built into the process.
The opportunities and obstacles that characterize a single
impact assessment process should be recognized as important
lessons that can be applied to improve the next process.
Lead agencies can learn to meet their needs in ways that are
least objectionable to the public. Similarly, the public can
learn to work with the lead agency rather than resort to
litigation. Impact assessment should be a learning process
and not merely the documentation of a decision that was
already made.
I would like to make a proposal that could conceivably
close the gap between the ideal and real models of impact
assessment. This recommendation involves a non-partisan
convenor who would facilitate public workshops, serve as a
liaison between the lead agency and all other interested
parties, document the process, and monitor and enforce the
findings of the EIS. The convenor is also the agent that
brings the lessons from one process to the next.
Offices staffed with trained facilitators who possess
substantive knowledge in impact assessment will be
established at the federal and state level. The office is
notified when a proposal is subject to NEPA or a SEPA. At
this earliest stage, the convenor meets with the lead agency
to discuss this proposal and other impact assessment
processes that are instructive.
Next, the convenor organizes and facilitates public
workshops to generate alternatives, discuss important issues,
and identify interested parties. The convenor facilitates
the collaborative production of a single text that records
the conclusions of the meeting. As with all of the documents
that are produced during the impact assessment process, the
lead agency will receive a copy.
Although the lead agency is encouraged to attend the
meetings, the success of the process does not depend on it.
Throughout the impact assessment process the convenor acts as
a liaison between the lead agency and the workshop
participants.
When the preferred alternative is identified, a
similarly structured scoping workshop is held. The public
identifies issues and parties, and can request additional
information. Again, the convenor facilitates the production
and circulation of a single text, that is given to the lead
agency.
The convenor conducts other informational workshops
commensurate with the complex or controversial nature of the
proposal. At least one workshop will address the adequacy of
the Draft EIS. The lead agency will receive the
documentation ano analysis f tne wor nanups earl y enough =%
the findings can be incorporated into the Final EIS.
After the Final EIS has been written, the public will
review it and comment on whether their concerns were
adequately addressed. The convenor will include these
comments in a final report to the lead agency that documents
the process and the lessons that have been learned. The
final document provides the key to better impact assessment
processes in the future. The covenor also has the
responsibility to monitor forecasted impacts, insure that
mitigation measures are carried out, and enforce any
agreements that have been made in the process.
The lead agency signs the final document and can make
written comments on the adequacy of the convenor's report and
analysis. This document is then filed in the convenor's
library which is open to the public.
In conclusion, a non-partisan convenor who documents the
impact assessment process and serves as a liaison between the
lead agency and the public would help to close the gap
between the ideal and real models of impact assessment. The
role and duties of the convenor would ensure that the project
definition is shaped by the impact assessment process.
technical information informs the project definition and
responds to public concerns, a forum for dialogue is created
between the public and the lead agency, and finally, that the
knowledge gained from one impact assessment process is
applied to the next.
APPENDIX A: APPROACH
Given the time constraints of this study, it was
necessary to bound the scope geographically and
chronologically. The six states comprising New England
limited the study area because they offer diversity in terms
of their natural environments and legal mandates for impact
assessment, yet are still recognized as a region. The
decision to conduct a retrospective analysis over the past
decade was made to keep the sample diverse yet allow trends
to emerge. Case studies were chosen as the most useful
illustrative device for the multi-party and multi-issue
examples of impact assessment.
Rather than unilaterally and randomly choosing a group
of impact assessment processes that fell within the
boundaries, I decided that it would be more interesting to
use examples that environmental professionals in New England
considered to be the most interesting.
Since time was limited, a focused sampling procedure was
undertaken. Every year, the Lincoln-Filene Center for
Citizenship and Public Affairs at Tufts University sponsors
the New England Environmental Conference. The Conference is
widely attended by environmental professionals that practice
in New England. Many of the agencies and organizations that
attend the Conference act as co-sponsors with the Lincoln-
Filene Center. The Lincoln-Filene Center publishes a list of
co-sponsors which, in 1984, included approximately 150
regional, state and local government agencies, private
organizations, and academic institutions. This publication
was obtained and all listings were contacted with the
exception of several organizations whose charter included a
single issue, or whose goals bore no apparent- relation to
impact assessment. The remaining entries were contacted by
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telephone. I explained that I was preparing to mail a
questionnaire about impact assessment and environmental
decision making in New England, and asked whether there was
someone in the office that could respond. A questionnaire
and cover letter was addressed and mailed to these
individuals in January of 1985.
Questionnaires were sent to 106 individuals. These
individuals were asked to, "...list projects, programs, or
policies that stand out in your mind as having the greatest
impact (either positive or negative) on environmental quality
in New England." They were also asked to answer a few
general questions regarding impact assessment. The
instructions that accompanied the questionnaire explained
that I would call them within a week to get their response.
The intention behind this strategy was to make
responding to the questionnaire effortless for the recipient
and ensure that I received a response. By the time I called,
the respondant had either written her answers to the
questions; read and thought about the questions; or just read
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was not available to respond. In this situation, I asked if
someone else in the office could answer the questions, and
accepted their answers. Several respondants filled out the
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questionnaire and mailed it back to me. Overall, responses
to the questionnaire varied from having been preceeded by a
considerable amount of thought to off-the-cuff answers.
The wide range of responses to the (first) question was
unexpected. It was anticipated that ten to fifteen specific
projects would clearly be established as the modal responses.
Instead, 130 different answers were received. This range is,
in large part, attributed to the phenomenon that respondants
tended to answer this question from their own experiences.
Despite the variety of answers, ten generic catagories
emerged. The catagories and frequency of response are:
1. waste management (46)
2. water quality (50)
3. energy (40)
4. land use (31)
5. transportation (14)
6. wetlands (17)
7. coastal zone (13)
G. acid rain (8)
9. air quality (9)
10. miscellaneous (17)
Acid rain, air quality, and miscellaneous were later
eliminated from further consideration. Although acid rain is
a particularly important issue in New England, since the
technical analysis is still in a formative stage and there is
a general lack of agreement regarding cause and effect
linkages, it was not considered to be suitable for a case
study.
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survey identified very few specific examples that could be
used for a case study. However, air quality is addressed in
several of the case studies that were selected.
After the elimination of these three catagories criteria
were identified to select the case studies from the remaining
seven catagories. The criteria that were used to determine
the case studies are:
1. There should be at least one case from each of the six
New England states.
2. Collectively, the cases should span the ten-year time
period.
3. Since Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Vermont have state
environmental policy acts, cases from each of these states
should be projects that were reviewed under these laws.
4. The specific project was mentioned in the survey.
The projects that met these criteria became the basis
for the case studies. The cases are:
1. The Criminal Court Facility
Hartford, Connecticut
Connecticut Environmental Policy Act
Approved 1982 - Construction
2. Big River Reservoir, Rhode Island
National Environmental Policy Act
Approved 1979 - Awaiting Congressional Authorization
3. Wastewater Treatment Facility Siting
Boston Harbor, Massachusetts
Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act
National Environmental Policy Act
In Progress 1985
4. Bay View Towers
Hull, Massachusetts
Massachusetts Coastal and Wetlands Regulations
Withdrawn 1980 - Lawsuit Pending
5. Pyramid Mall
Chittendon County, Vermont
Land Use and Development Act (Act 250)
Permit Denied 1980
6. Extension of Interstate 93 through Franconia Notch
Franconia Notch State Park, New Hamphshire
National Environmental Policy Act
Approved 1979 - Construction
7. Dickey-Lincoln School Lakes Dam
Aroostook County, Maine
National Environmental Policy Act
Rejected 1978
The selection of the specific case studies was intended
to provide an interesting array, through time and space, of
impact assessment processes. Yin is intructive when he says,
"...case studies, like experiments are generalizable to
theoretical propositions and not to populations or universes.
In this sense, the case study, like the experiment does not
represent a "sample," and the investigator's goal is to
expand and generalize theories (analytic generalization) and
not to enumerate frequencies (statistical generalization)."4
The selection of cases was not intended to represent the
most important projects in each state, nor were they intended to
represent the most important examples of impact assessment in
New England. First of all, "most important" is a subjective
judgement, and secondly, an attempt to address the most
important examples would require the number of cases to be
increased several times over which was not possible given the
time constraints of the study.
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Environmental Impact Assessment Review is a quarterly journal designed to
bridge the gap between theory and practice in the field of impact
assessment. Readers of Environmental Impact Assessment Review generally
include planners, engineers, scientists, and administrators involved in the
practice of impact assessment.
In addition to the three regular issues per year we also produce an annual
thematic issue. The theme of this year's special issue is, "The Role of
Impact Assessment in Environmental Decision Making in New England: A Ten
Year Retrospective." In this issue we will explore how state and national
regulatory requirements have affected environmental decision making and
what role these requirements have played in minimizing adverse environmental
impacts in New England.
Since you are knowledgeable of key environmental decisions which have been
made in New England over the past decade we are interested in your views on
the subject. Please take a few moments to complete the attached questionnaire.
We are sending this questionnaire to a cai'efully selected group of
individuals, agencies, and organizations throughout New England. We will
use your completed questionnaire to identify New England's most important
environmental decisions. These decisions will become the basis for several
case studies which will appear in the special issue.
I will.call you within the week to discuss your responses to the
questionnaire. Please do not hesitate to call me if you have any questions.
Thank you for your help.
Sincerely,
Lisa Berzok
Special Editor
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This is a survey conducted by Environmental Impact
Assessment Review. We will call you between 1/21/85 and
2/1/85 to discuss your responses-to'this questionnaire. For
further information contact:
Lisa Berzok, Special Editor (617) 253-1367.
The purpose of this questionnaire is to help us identify the
most important environmental decisions that have been made in New
England over the past decade. We are interested both in
decisions that resulted in new projects, policies, or programs as
well as decisions that prevented change from occurring.
I. Please list a few of the projects, policies, or programs that
stand out in your mind as having the greatest impact (either
positive or negative) on environmental quality in New England
over the past 10 years.
-please note the state, proponent, and year if you are familiar with
the details.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
II. Do you think that the decision to proceed or not with these
projects, policies, or programs listed above were based on (a) the
best technical/scientific analysis and (b) adequate public
participation/attention to public concern? (answer in space
provided below)
list 1-5 from
(a)
best possible technical/ -
(b)
adequate public pdrticipation
I.above scientific analysis attention to public concern
yes no un sure ves no un sure.
I.
4.
'I.. 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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APPENDIX B: CASE STUDY
Criminal Court Facility, Hartford, Connecticut
BachgCound
Like many states, Connecticut passed its environmental
protection act in the early 70's. During these years, the
beginning of the environmental decade, there was a state-wide
interest in protecting the quality of the environment.
The legislative mandate for environmental protection in
Connecticut comes from two pieces of legislation, the
i
Connecticut Environmental Protection Act of 1970 and the
2
Connecticut Environmental Policy Act of 1978. The latter is
commonly referred to as, "CEPA".
The Environmental Protection Act gave individual
citizens standing to sue to protect the environment. This
Act has been called the "private action" or "citizen action"
Act. Michigan passed the first citizen action act and was
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the model for Connecticut's Act.
The second piece of legislation, the Connecticut
Environmental Policy Act (CEPA) of 1978, follows the example
of the National Environmental Policy Act. CEPA was intended
to supplement the Environmental Protection Act with a formal
review of the impacts associated with the state-sponsored
projects. The policy statement for CEPA announces,
"It is now understood that human activity must be guided by
and in harmony with the system of relationships among the
elements of nature. Therefore the general assembly hereby
declares that the policy of the state of Connecticut is to
conserve, improve and protect its natural resources and
environment and to control air, land and water pollution in
order to enhance the health, safety and welfare of the people
of the state."
CEPA requires all state agencies initiating actions
that may "significantly affect the environment" to produce a
written evaluation of its environmental impact before
deciding to proceed with the proposed action. The written
statement takes the form of an Environmental Impact
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Evaluation (EIE) . While several state agencies play a role
in reviewing the EIE, the Office of Policy and Management
(OPM) has the ultimate responsibility of reviewing the EIE
for procedural compliance and determining whether the EIE has
responded to the issues that have been raised during the
comment period. The OPM documents this review in a "record
of decision".
The Progect
As early as 1964, the State Judicial Department has been
planning to site and construct a new Criminal Court Facility
7
in Hartford's Capitol Center District. The site for the
facility comprises most of the block bounded by Russ,
Lafayette, Grand and Oak Streets. Prior to construction,
much of the site was used as a parking lot. The history of
this project is punctuated by master plans for the Capitol
Center District, state acquisition of properties in this
block, several site plans, and a state-sponsored community
workshop (see attached chronology).
At this writing, construction of the new Criminal Court
Facility is nearly complete. Designed as a 5-story 120,000
square foot building, it will be connected to the existing
state courthouse by an overhead pedestrian bridge. Parking
space will be provided for 52) cars. The landscape element
for the site includes shade trees and raised planting beds.
The Judicial Department's need for a new Criminal Court
Facility was not a point of contention. The Hartford-New
Britain Judicial District handles the heaviest case load in
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the state judiciary, a case load which continues to
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increase. Between 1978 and 1981, Type A criminal cases
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increased by 24'4. The existing facilities simply were not
designed to handle this volume of cases and are described as,
".. .overcrowded, security provisions are deficient, cell
block design is obsolete, and basic amenities for the public,
attorneys, witnesses, jurors, litigants and court personnel
fail to meet minimum and and/or acceptable standards."11
Currently, the functions of the Hartford-New Britain
Judicial District are carried out at two locations; one at
Washington Street and the other at a city-owned building at
Morgan Street. These buildings are separated by
approximately one mile.
Siting the new building just on the other side of
Lafayette Street from the existing court house would allow
the buildings to be physically, as well as visually,
connected. The EIE emphasized three key benefits to the
skywalk: (1) an economy of staff and jury pool could be
achieved; (2) the economy of staff and jurors would serve to
mitigate traffic and parking impacts; and (3) during
inclimate weather people could avoid going outside in order
12
to travel between the two buildings.
The Judicial Department plans to vacate the city-owned
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Morgan Street building upon completion of the new facility.
Since the state is exempt from local taxation, the city is
anxious to regain control of the building and return it to
the Grand List.
CEPA requires an EIE to evaluate the costs and benefits
of a proposed state action. The cost benefit analysis in
this EIE relies on the abovementioned improved security and
convenience of the new facility and the return of the Morgan
Street building to the city in demonstration of the project's
feasibility.
Alternatives
Under CEPA, state agencies are required to consider
alternatives to the proposed action. However, prior to this
impact assessment process the project had already been
fundamentally determined by three factors; (1) the Department
had clearly demonstrated a need for the new facility; (2) the
state already owned most of the property in the block bounded
by Russ, Lafayette, Grand and Oak- Street; and (3) the
consideration of alternative sites was equated with the no-
build alternative.
The no-build scenario assumed the Judicial Department
would vacate the Morgan Street building without another
builgnej-in Hartford to replace it. Therefore, this scenario
included the loss of courtrooms and staff offices, and would
require prisoners to be transported to outlying areas with
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available court facilities. This scenario would aggravate
the court's backlog and security problems and was , "... not
considered a viable solution to the critical need for
14
judicial facilities in the Hartford area."
The alternatives that were considered (identified as
schemes A-L) in this impact assessment process were basically
siting and design variations of the facility at the Lafayette
Street site. The alternatives are distinguished by whether
the building would be square or rectangular, the respective
placement of the building, parking and security yard, and
whether Lafayette Street would be closed to traffic.
Goodkind and O'Dea, Inc. updated their 1979 traffic
study to determine the impacts from closing Lafayette Street.
They did not recommend any alternative that included closing
Lafayette Street because of the traffic and parking problems
15
it would create.
In 1981 scheme J was chosen because it best satisfied
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the requirements regarding:
1. Viable traffic flow.
2. Adequate parking for the new court and replacement of
existing parking.
3. Minimum disruption of adjoining neighborhoods to the West
and South.
4. Design compatibility to adjoining residential-office-
commercial neighborhoods to the West and South in the
Historical District,
5. Design compatibility to adjoining civic-commercial-
institutional neighborhoods to the East and North.
6. Visual strengthening of the civic plaza to the North of
the existing courthouse extending to the Capital Building and
providing an appropriate visual transition from public and
large scale to small scale areas which interface at
Layfayette between Russ and Grand Streets.
1 0)
Scheme J included a square building at the northern part
of the site with a pedestrian bridge connection to the
Washington Street facility. Decked parking would be provided
on the north and south sides of the building with surface
parking at Grand Street. The security yard was located at
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the northern part of the site.
A minor revision to scheme J connected the two upper
level parking lots. The purpose of this change was to allow
for better traffic flow. Renamed as scheme L, this
alternative was reviewed and approved by the Judicial
Department and was adopted by the Capitol Center Commission
18
on March 11, 1981.
Land Use and Conflicts
The area immediately surrounding the site can be
described by the juxtaposition of four districts and the
interaction of their users. The districts are: the Capitol
Center District; a residential neighborhood; an office zone;
and an historic district. The conflicts among these land
uses are common in urban areas where development pressures
and competition for space are keen.
The Capitol Center District is the location of many of
Connecticut's state government offices. The District is
characterized by office buildings, the ornamental State
Capitol Building, and manicured lawns. The area is clearly
legible as a civic center. As noted above, the site of the
new Criminal Court Facility is located at the southwestern
corner of the Capitol Center District across the street, on
1 1
one side from the state court house, and on the other, abuts
a Residential-Office zone. Throughout the history of the
project, the state has acquired the larger portion of land on
this block.
A largely hispanic residential area borders the Capitol
Center District to the west. The quality of the housing
stock in this neighborhood is mixed; some is well maintained
or recently improved, while some is abandoned and in serious
disrepair.
The voice of the community was, for the most part,
articulated by the Hungerford Block Association and Hartford
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Area Rally Together (HART). In recent years, the residents
have been actively defending their identity as a neighborhood
against the growing trend of residential conversions to law
offices. Many law firms, in order to be close to the court
house have bought inexpensive housing units in this area for
their offices. With only a 1-2'4 housing vacancy in
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Hartford the conversions continue to remove well needed
housing stock from the market and encourage speculation
pressures on the existing residents.
An important victory for the neighborhood was won in
1979 through their work with the City Planning Department to
down-zone parts of the neighborhood from Residential-Office
(R-0) to Residential (R) zones. Peter Spitzner explained
that the R-O designation was intended to encourage office
development on vacant parcels. Contrary to the desired
result of the zoning, law firms have been converting
102
residential buildings into office buildings.
The current residents were apprehensive about the new
court facility because of the additional number of law firms
it would attract to the neighborhood. This reasonably
anticipated trend was perceived as a threat to the integrity
of their community. Peter Spitzner explained that the
neighborhood, which used to be characterized by residents
socializing in the street and on their porches, is being
increasingly transformed into a 9-to-5 district.
Between the Capitol Center District and the residential
area is an expanding office zone. This zone has evolved out
of law firms' needs to be close to the existing state
courthouse. Although the conversions are unwelcomed by the
residents, the office buildings do serve as a buffer between
the courthouse and the neighborhood. Additionally, they have
populated the area because the zoning designation permitted
it and the market rates encouraged it.
The other important district in this area is known as
"Frog Hollow," which is listed in the National Register of
Historic Places. The organization that focused on historic
preservation was the Hartford Architectural Conservancy
(HAC). In a past era, Frog Hollow was descriptive of the
marshy conditions that were caused by the Park River. Long
since routed underground, the Park River was the site of some
of Connecticut's first mills. Today, some of the remaining
mills along Capitol Avenue have converted into office
buildings.
Many of the residential buildings in the immediate
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vicinity of the new Court Facility were once company housing
for the mill workers. The housing has a distinctive style
commonly referred to as "perfect sixes". The double bowfront
brick buildings housed six families, many of which were
recent immigrants. Collectively, these buildings stand as a
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record of the history of this area. Toni Gold, the former
Executive Director of HAC explained that the industrial
history of the state is embodied in this district, as a
whole, not in any single building.
HAC's main concerns in this impact assessment process
was the preservation of five of the perfect sixes on the
western edge of the site, and a Greek-Revival building that
was built in the 1850's. Ultimately, all of these buildings
were preserved.
Public Involvement
The Bureau of Public Works (BPW), within the
Department of Administrative Services (DAS), was largely
responsible for opening the decision making process to the
public. From within the government bureaucracy they were
encouraged to take advantage of the state's sovereign
immunity to local laws and issues. Instead, the DAS and the
BPW tried to introduce a new mentality to the state planning
process. They worked to establish credibility with the
community and have since used this experience with public
involvement as a model for other EIEs in which they have been
involved.
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Eugene Puhopek from BPW said that in 1979 a proposal was
made by the court architect which required the state to
acquire all the properties on the block, clear it, site the
Court Facility, and pave the rest for parking. He explained
that this plan was entirely unacceptable to the neighborhood
organizations and HAC, and served as a catalyst for public
involvement.
In response to a suggestion by HAC, BPW held a public
workshop in July of 1980 to discuss the plans for the new
Criminal Court Facility. Approximately fifty people attended
this meeting including residents and neighborhood
organizations, church leaders, lawyers, politicians, state
officials, and HAC. Eugene Puhopek explained that the
workshop was an open forum to discuss the Criminal Court
Facility and although it could have turned into a haranguing
and finger-pointing session, participants used the
opportunity to make constructive comments.
Bob Pawlowski of the Southside News said,
"Through the public workshop the courthouse was redesigned.
HAC helped the community to make substantive comments on the
plan. The original design included paving a lot of the site
and was ugly. The state responded by hiring a new architect
who was more sympathetic with the surrounding, older
buildings. The result was they did not knock down as many
buildings and they put some of the parking underground. The
final plan was much better than the first."22
Other smaller meetings were held between DAS, BPW, HAC
and the City Planning Department to understand the needs of
each of the four districts and to try to make the project as
acceptable as possible. It was generally acknowledged that
the fundamental attributes of the project were predetermined.
10C5
Given that the project would be built on the site, the state
responded to the public's concerns and took measures to
mitigate impacts.
Responding to the neighborhood's concern regarding
parking impacts the new facility was designed to meet the new
demand it would generate. However, by providing parking
exclusively for the Judicial Department, Executive Branch
parkers (currently parking on the site) would be displaced.
The EIE acknowledged the parking shortage in the area, but
stressed that the new court facility is not intended to be a
solution to this (larger) problem.
The state determined that increased traffic flows would
be experienced primarily along Interstate 84 and Lafayette
Circle. A very small portion of this traffic would affect
the neighborhood. The amount of traffic through this area
would be proportionately low and easily accomodated by
24
intersection capacities.
The residents were also concerned about air quality
impacts. The EIE noted that there would be construction
impacts of dust and emissions from construction equipment,
25
but they would be short term in nature. Additionally, the
amount of traffic that would be generated and emissions from
fuel burning equipment were well below the Department of
Environmental Protection's (DEP) permit threshold. Since
emissions would not exceed DEP's air quality standards,
impacts were not considered to be significant.
Through modifications to the siting and design of the
new facility, HAC's interests were also incorporated into the
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planning process. As a result of the decked parking, space
was more efficiently used and gave the Judicial Department
the flexibility to leave the row of perfect sixes on the
western boundary of the site untouched.
During the impact assessment process for the Criminal
Court Facility the state noticeably departed from its normal
decision making procedures. Working with the community to
make the project acceptable, Kathryn Vernon said, "The state
took a step back, in order to work with the community, which
was not necessarily to its own benefit." Eugene Puhopek said
that the state really made an effort to be good neighbors,
and in the end, everyone's interests were served.
The Role of the EIE
In 1982, DAS commissioned PRC HARRIS, Inc. to prepare
the EIE for the new Criminal Court Facility. Eugene Puhopek
said that PRC acted as an extension of the state planning
process and did not lead the state in the assessment of the
project.
The EIE came relatively late in the project history. By
the time it was written, the public workshop and several
informal meetings had served to successfully manage the
conflict of the proposal. The EIE does not include a
discussion of the land use conflicts or their resolution. Of
course, CEPA does not require a discussion of issues that
have been resolved prior to the preparation of the EIE.
However, the EIE makes no mention of the conflicts and that
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they had been successfully resolved, and at times, the
assessment of impacts appears superficial. No major impacts
were forecasted, therefore, because all of the potential
problems had been ironed out in advance of the release of the
document.
The state was very pleased with the EIE and considered
it to be a high quality document. This was one of the first
EIEs prepared under the DAS. Kathryn Vernon says they they
were a "learning client" and took the process very seriously.
Ron Cretaro, the spokesperson for the Hungerford Block
Association said that some of the analyses in which the
community was particularly interested, e.g. traffic and
noise, were very technical and difficult to understand. Ron
Cretaro was also one of a few citizens who spoke at the
public hearing, testifying on his concerns about community
impacts of the project. The state points to the lack of
testimony from the public as an indication of how successful
the process had been in working out any problems. Ron
Cretaro explained this phenomenon from a different
perspective. He said that few residents spoke at the hearing
because many people were intimidated by the formality of the
occasion.
Conclusion
The state clearly made an effort in the impact
assessment process to address community concerns even when it
meant backing down from what they would have considered to
have been the optimal plan. The neighborhood considers the
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Court Facility to be a catalyst for speculation and
conversion but they also admit these pressures already
existed. Michael Allison of HART explains that there is a
city-wide problem of public institutions expanding into
residential areas that cumulatively contribute to Hartford's
low-income housing crisis. Nobody claims that the Criminal
Court Facility turned the tide on these trends, rather than
it is just one more factor that makes life hard for low
income families in Hartford.
Ron Cretaro explained that the neighborhood
organizations did not have the resources that would be
required to bring a suit against the state to stop the
project. Instead, the Hungerford Block Association and HART
defended the neighborhood against this project through an
ongoing effort with the City Planning Department to down-zone
more areas in the neighborhood. In this case, the citizen's
defense was completely outside the impact assessment process,
but did not revert to litigation.
The neighborhood organizations, particularly HART, have
recently been involved with a city-ordered 6 month moratorium
on conversions from residential to office uses. The purpose
of the moratorium is to provide protection for the
neighbhorhoods while the city develops a Housing Preservation
and Replacement Ordinance. The Ordinance will require as a
prerequisite to a residential-to-office conversion that the
new owner replace the lost housing units or contribute to a
Housing Trust Fund. The Fund will be administered by the
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city to meet Hartford' housing needs.
Impact assessment was designed to evaluate projects on a
case by case basis. The Criminal Court Facility illustrates
how impact assessment is not the proper tool for dealing with
larger, systematic problems, namely institutional expansion
and housing shortages for low-income families. The
fragmented approach of impact assessment is exacerbated when
the sponsoring agency can demonstrate that the need for the
project is non-negotiable.
11.0
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Chronology of Events
1964- 5 Courthouse Study Committee chaired by Chief Justice
House recommended acquisiton of the block to be used for
judicial purposes.
1966 The Hartford Sugerigr Court Building: A
Feasibility Re2grt. This report concluded that
expansion of the Washington Street facility would be
appropriate considering future use of the area. This
study included a plan to close Lafayette Street between
Russ and Grand Streets.
1967 1) Special Act 276 Sec 2 par(Y)(1) authorized
$6 million for an addition to the existing courthouse.
2) Public Act 589 established the Connecticut Capitol
Center Commission to create a master plan for the
development of the Connecticut Capitol Center to be
known as the "Capitol District".
3) Inital master plan for the new court house was
prepared by Rogers, Taliafero, Kostritsky, and Lamb.
1968 New expansion plans for the court were prepared due
to the City's concern about closing Lafayette
Street. The plans were approved by the Capitol
Center Commission.
1969 1) Special Act 281 Sec 2 par (Y)(5) authorized
$4 million for courthouse facilities in Hartford.
2) Sec 12 limited property acquisition by
condemnation for construction of courthouse facilities
to certain parcels.
3) Master Plan for the Capitol Center District:
Final Technical Regort was prepared by Raymond, May,
Parish & Pine and passed by the Commission. This plan
proposed a new route to serve the Capitol Center
(Buckingham Loop) and a new court building.
1970-1 1) Basic plans for new courthouse were completed.
2) Several properties were acquired by
condemnation.
3) After a re-evaluation of the Capitol Center
Plan which was ordered by the Governor work on project
was halted.
1972-6 1) Court Reorganizaiton Bill rendered earlier plans
obsolete.
2) Capitol Commission removes Buckingham Loop.
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3) Decision to design a new Criminal Courthouse
and rennovate the existing Superior Court.
1976 Other parcels were considered.
1978 Plans drawn up for the original site.
1979 1) At the request of the State Properties Review
Board, a Traffic and Parking Study was prepared by
Goodkind & O'Dea, Inc.
2) EIE for proposed Criminal Court Facility was
prepared by Anderson-Nichols & Co.
1980 1) A public workshop was held at the suggestion of
the Hartford Architectural Conservancy.
2) In response to issues raised Carlin & Pozzi,
Architects were hired by the Department of
Administrative Services to document alternatives that
have been considered and the advantages of a combined
facility.
1981 1) Goodkind & O'Dea updated 1979 Traffic Study
2) A formal presentation was made to the Judicial
Facilities Committee. Scheme J was chosen.
2) Minor revisions were made to produce Scheme L.
This scheme was adopted by the Capitol Center
Commission.
3) Special Act 81-71.2 (0)(1) authorized
$7,040,000 for the project. (Bringing the total up to
$17, 040, 000).
4) The Department of Administrative Services hired
PRC HARRIS to prepare the EIE based on Scheme L.
1982 EIE completed by PRC HARRIS (March).
1982 EIE approved by Office of Policy and Management
(August).
1983 Construction begins (August).
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APPENDIX C: CASE STUDY
Pyramid Mall, Chittendon County, Vermont
BaggCund
In 1970, the state of Vermont passed the Land Use and
1 2
Development Act, generally referred to as Act 250. Act 250
requires that any proposed development involving more than
ten acres of land receive a land use permit prior to
construction. To implement the mandates of Act 250, a
state-wide heirarchical structure consisting of one
Environmental Board and nine District Environmental
Commissions was created. The permit process is primarily the
responsibility of the 3-person District Commission. The
District Commissions review permit applications, hear
testimony, and make final decisions. The Environmental Board
is a policy making body and sits as a board of appeals for
decisions rendered by the District Commissions.
In 1976, the Pyramid Company of Burlington signed a
tentative agreement to buy an 80-acre site at Tafts Corner in
Chittendon County, for the location of a regional shopping
mall. Based simply on the approximate scale of this
development there was no question that it would require an
Act 250 permit. An unusually long review culminated in the
denial of the permit in 1978. This process simultaneously
contributed to the pqlitical unification of Burlington and
the political division of Williston. At the time, the review
of the Pyramid proposal was considered to be the biggest and
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the most expensive in the eight year history of the state's
4
development control law.
The Proggsal
In July 1977, the Pyramid Company applied for an Act 250
permit to build an enclosed regional shopping mall in the
town of Williston. Williston is characterized as a "quiet,
5
rural community." The site is largely open space with a few
scattered farms and residences. Located at the intersection
6
of "two lightly travelled two-lane roads, Routes 2 and 2A,"
and a quarter of a mile from Interstate 89, the site is just
6 miles from Burlington's central business district.
Although the mall would be located in the Town of Williston,
the impacts were predicted to fall most heavily upon the City
of Burlington.
As proposed, the Pyramid Mall would include two
department stores, 80 smaller shops, 20 restaurants and other
food serving facilities, public areas, parking lots for more
than 2,000 cars, driveways, facilities for treating surface
7
runoff and sewage, and landscaped grounds. The development
would occupy more than 90 acres of the 200 acre site which
was formerly used as a hayfield. The building, itself, would
8
be big enough to enclose 10 football fields and would be
unequalled in size by any previous development in the region.
Act 250 Reguirements and Decision
All developments that fall within the purview of Act 250
must comply with 10 criteria that are explicitly stated in
1114
section 6086 of the law. These criteria are concerned with
(1) water and air pollution, (2) water supply, (3) water
availability, (4) soil erosion, (5) highway congestion, (6)
provision of educational services, (7) provision of
municipal services, (8) natural beauty and natural areas,
(9) conformance with the state Capability and Development
9
Plan, and (10) conformance with the local or regional
plans. The goal, of course, is to minimize the adverse
impacts of new developments.
After more than a year of reviewing the Pyramid
Company's application, supporting evidence, and testimony
received at 43 public hearings, District Commission #4 denied
the Company's application for an Act 250 permit. The
application was rejected because it failed to meet several of
the relevant criteria; (5) highway congestion, (7) burden
on the ability of local governments to provide services, (9)
conformance with the Capability and Development Plan,
specifically in terms of the burden to private utility
services, costs of public services and facilities (relative
to the public benefits of scattered development), demands on
public facilities and services, jeopardizing or interfering
with the efficiency of existing services, and (10)
10
conformance with the local and regional plan. In general,
the Commission's decision to deny the permit was tied to a
larger set of concerns regarding negative economic impacts to
Burlington's central business district and the city's tax
structure, the rural character of the region, traffic
1 15
patterns, and the burden on Chittendon County's municipal
services. The importance of these issues to the residents
and planning bodies in the district contributed to the
controversial nature of the review process.
Since permits are usually granted by the Commission, the
decision to deny the Pyramid Company's application
represented an exception to the typical review. From 1970 to
1980, of the 3,740 Act 250 permits that were acted upon only
11
95, or 2.5%4 were denied.
The Commission is not empowered to work with the
developer to identify ways of mitigating potential impacts of
a proposal. However, the decision to deny a permit may
contain guidelines for the necessary modifications that would
12
make the application acceptable. In the decision to deny
the Pyramid application, the Commission clearly explained how
the application had failed to meet specific criteria of Act
250.
When a permit is denied, the applicant may reapply or
appeal the decision. The applicant has the choice of
appealing the case to the Environmental Board or the State
Superior (appellate) Court. In the case of the Pyramid
application, after the District Commission denied the permit
the Pyramid Company appealed to the Superior Court. In an
attempt to expedite the appeal they made a motion to have the
court accept a majority of the record established during the
Act 250 process. This motion was denied. The Pyramid
Company also filed an interlocutory appeal to the State
Superior Court which, too, was denied.
11.6
Prelimin ary Local Review
Before applying for an Act 250 permit, the Pyramid
Company had to first, obtain the Williston Planning
Commission's approval. A heated debate concerning individual
property rights characterized the local review process. Some
residents felt that government should not interfere with
property rights. This camp argued that the decision to use
one's property, even to build a regional shopping mall, is an
exercise of a fundamental liberty which is beyond the
legitimate reach of government. The other side of this
debate was voiced by residents who felt that the proposal, if
effected, would adversely affect the quality of life in
Williston. This group argued that government's proper role
is to restrict property rights when the general welfare of
the community is threatened.
The controversy over property rights and the role of
government, coupled with the environmental and economic
implications of this proposal, was a weighty issue in the
town of Williston. It was such an important debate that
candidates for local offices ran on clearly pro- or anti-mall
platforms, and were elected on that basis. At the time, the
local newspaper announced that, "Anti-Mall interests hold a
majority on the town Board of Selectmen; pro-Mall advocates
13
control the Planning Commission.
After fiery public hearings and an approval process that
lasted from May to December of 1977, The town of Williston
finally gave the Pyramid Company the go ahead. Later, the
District Commissioners in their decision to deny the Act 250
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permit, stated,
"We cannot say that Williston Planning Commission's decision
was manifestly wrong on the basis of the evidence available
to it, but if the planning commission had been able to
consider all the evidence that was before us, they might have
well decided otherwise."14
The Commission was referring to the reams of testimony and
technical studies they had considered and which had
substantially informed its decision during the Act 250 review
process.
Pre-Hearing Cgonerences Under Act 250
Two pre-hearing conferences were held in August of 1977.
The purpose of the pre-hearing conference is to determine who
will be a statutory party (i.e. a formally recognized
participant) in the application review and to identify the
important issues embodied by a proposed project. These
conferences are not required for every permit review under
Act 250. The District Commission convenes pre-hearing
conferences when it anticipates that an application will be
controversial or accompanied with a wealth of technical
evidence. They are frequently used prior to the review of
very large developments.
Participants in a pre-hearing conference include the
District Coordinator, a member of the District Commission,
the applicant, and the statutory parties that are enumerated
in Act 250 (e.g. the local municipality, state agencies, and
adjoining landowners). During the pre-hearings the District
Commission can use its discretion to admit other parties that
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may be affected by the proposal or whose participation will
assist the Commission. Arthur Hogan of the Chittendon County
Regional Planning Commission said,
"... the beauty of the Act 250 process is that it is
accessible to all citizens... People are involved in permit
review as statutory parties, and through the public hearings
which are open to everyone. The public hearing process
relies on participation to question the proposal. The
District Commission is capable of investigating the
application on its own, but it really depends on public
participation."15
Statutory parties to the Pyramid Company's application were
The Pyramid Company
Town of Williston Planning Commission
Chittendon County Regional Planning Commission
State of Vermont Agencies
City of Burlington
City of Winooski
Richmond Planning Commission
City of South Burlington
Central Vermont Regional Planning Commission
Village of Essex Junction
Advison County Regional Planning and Development Commission
Williston Committee for Responsible Growth
Williston Landowner's Association
Adjoining Landowners
As stated above, Act 250 establishes the criteria that a
proposal must meet. However, the pre-hearing helps to
identify the most important issues and the sequence in which
these issues will be heard. This stage appears to be for the
applicant's benefit, to aid their preparation of a proposal.
Basically, the pre-hearings lay the groundwork for the formal
hearing and review process.
No testimony is taken during the pre-hearing conferences
and they are considered to be fairly informal meetings. Pre-
hearing conferences are analogous to the "scoping" process
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required by the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and
the Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act (MEPA). The
important difference between Act 250's pre-hearing conference
and the NEPA and MEPA scoping process is that the former is a
discretionary feature while the latter is mandatory.
Public Awareness and Participation
If the Pyramid Companys purchase of a site to build the
Mall went unnoticed there was no lack of public awareness
once Williston's local review process was underway.
Additional public notice was provided with the commencement
of the Act 250 review. At the earliest stages of a District
Commission's review, notice is put in the local newspapers
and sent to adjoining landowners, town clerks, and the
statutory parties that have been identified during the pre-
hearing conferences.
Unlike the discretionary pre-hearings, Act 250 requires
formal public hearings. The District Commission conducts the
quasi-judicial hearing in a courtroom atmosphere. The
statutory parties are represented by their lawyers throughout
this phase. Public hearings provide a forum for the
presentation of technical studies, testimony by expert
witnesses and statutory parties, and cross examination for
each criterion. In the case of the Pyramid Mall application,
43 hearings were held.
Attendance at the hearings varied according to the
issue, but in general, they were considered to be
enlightening and accessible. Initially, many citizens came
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to the hearings but over the span of a year attendance
gradually decreased. The meeting that was held on the day
that the final decision was rendered, however, was well
attended.
Agnalysis and Assessment
The Commission's assessment of the Pyramid Company's
application was fundamentally determined by the ten criteria
specified by Act 250. The pre-hearing conferences helped to
identify which criteria were most relevant. Within these
bounds, the District Commission broadly interpreted the
statute to address off-site impacts despite the objections of
the Pyramid Company. For example, the Commission devoted a
considerable portion of its decision to the discussion and
evaluation of economic impacts, particularly as they would
affect Burlington; despite the fact that economic impact is
not an explicit criterion and that the development was sited
16
in Williston. Using criteria (6),(7), and (9). The
Commission explained that economic impact from a reduced tax
base is an implicit part of an "unreasonable burden" to
provide municipal services. Peter Meyer from the
Environmental Board said that a District Commission's
decision to loo4:: at off-site impacts is considered to be an
17
acceptable scope of inquiry.
A particulary persuasive study concerning economic
impact that was predicted to fall on Burlington was made by
Thomas Muller in his report, "The Economic and Fiscal Effects
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of a Proposed Shopping Mall on the State of Vermont."
Muller described how a predicted transfer of sales from
Burlington's central business district to the Pyramid Mall
would lead to severe adverse economic impacts on Burlington,
(which the Commission later interpreted to be an
"unreasonable burden"). The transfer of sales was predicted
to "... result in a 10 to 14 percent reduction in current
19
property tax base between 1978 and 1983."
The question of whether the development would, "...cause
unreasonable congestion with respect to the use of highways,"
presented a particularly complex and technical problem. The
Commission found, "The traffic that would be generated added
to the otherwise expected traffic increase, would cause below
20
level of service "C" ... at 7 specific locations." These
locations were identified through a computer model referred
21
to as the "Adler Analyis." The model illustrated the
choices drivers make when the quickest routes are slowed by
22
traffic. Provisions for improvements necessary to maintain
an acceptable level of service were made for just three of
those locations.
The Commission noted the variability in the assumptions
behind the research on traffic impacts. Questioning the
validity of the assumptions in the Adler Analysis, the
Commission stated,
"The distribution of customers among the surrounding
communities is speculative. There appears to be no way of
determining the extent to which congestion might be partially
mitigated by shoppers choosing to avoid peak hours in view of
known congestion, instead of taking - and overloading -
alternative routes as forecasted by Adler."23
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The Commission also addressed assumptions embodied in
the trip generation rate. The trip generation rate was used
to predict the volume of traffic entering or. leaving the mall
at the peak hour.
"For the average weekday, Adler used a rate of 5.7 per 1,000
square feet of gross leaseable area. The applicant's own
expert maintained that the appropriate rate was 3.12. The
[Highway] Department chose a rate of 4.7. A re-run of the
Adler computations using the applicant's rate showed minor,
if any adjustments for some links and substantial adjustments
for others."24
The Commission also extended the criterion regarding air
pollution to apply not merely to the operation of the mall
buildings, but to the exhaust from traffic that would be
generated by shoppers and employees. Although the permit was
decided on other grounds, the Commission made this
distinction, "... in the event that this conclusion should be
25
reversed on appeal."
The Act 250 process does not exempt an applicant from
other state permit processes. Concurrent with the Act 250
hearings, the Pyramid Company had applied for an air quality
certificate of compliance from the state. The Pyramid
Company had already filed two applications, both of which had
been rejected. Even with the District Commission's approval
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construction could not proceed without this certificate.
The Pyramid Company redesigned several features of the
Mall in order to mitigate negative impacts. Some of these
measures were identified through the public hearings while
others were identified through the state permit processes.
"Following a state denial of Pyramid's plan to discharge
sanitary sewage effluent into the Winooski River, Pyramid
proposed a system that would dispose the effluent through a
network of subsurface leach pipes on a site several miles
from the mall. The state and Williston have approved the
plan, and the revision received little opposition at Act 250
hearings."27
The applicant was prepared to build, operate, and
maintain a tertiary sewage treatment plant that would remove
984 of the impurities from the effluent generated by the
mall. Effluent above the design capacity would be held in a
storage lagoon until it could be treated. A flow-net
analysis was used to determine that the soils in the proposed
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leach field were adequate for subsurface disposal.
The surface runoff system was very elaborate and it was
capable of handling runoff from a "100 year storm". The
system involved the collection of runoff, removal of flotable
and settleable material, chemical treatment, and on-site
dispersion through crushed stone berms. However, there was
some question as to whether the runoff might contain
substances that could contaminate the soil. The Commission
noted that there was no expert testimony to dispell this
suspicion and if runoff had been a pivotal issue, monitoring
for toxicity would become important to their decision. Since
they were going to deny the permit on other grounds it was
29
only briefly mentioned.
In evaluating the costs of scattered development the
Commission tied their findings to earlier conclusions they
had made concerning the economic impact to Burlington. The
Commission found that a decrease in Burling.ton's tax revenue
would ultimately place "an unreasonable burden on the ability
of the City of Burlington to provide municipal and government
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services..." The District Commission stated,
"In the instant case we feel that a test of whether or not a
burden is unreasonable is whether a municipality may expect
to receive back benefits from the development, either
immediate or deferred, which approach its costs ... " They
ultimately found that the burden of local government would
weigh less heavily on Williston's taxpayers ... we do not
see ... that benefits will accrue to the City of Burlington
and its taxpayers from the proposed development."30
Noticeably absent from the language of the decision were
the typical impact assessment catagories of unavoidable
adverse, short term versus long term, and cumulative impacts.
Implicit, however, in the discussion of the criteria which
the applicant failed to satisfy was that the forecasted
impacts were unacceptable and prohibitive of project
approval.
In general, the analysis that was done for the Pyramid
Mall was considered "...to be of very high quality and
professionally done," Many consultant teams were called in
to conduct studies, give testimony at the public hearings,
and be cross examined by the Commissioners and attorneys
representing the statutory parties. Bruce Hyde from
Burlington's Planning Department said,
"The arguments that were made by the consultants supported
the position of their client. Then, it became the District
Commission's responsibility to consider and weigh these
arguments."31
The Town of Williston has found some of the studies,
particularly the traffic and water pollution analyses, to be
of continuing use. Frank Murray, the attorney for Burlington
during the review said, "Although the proposal was an
emotional issue, the decision was based on the facts and
3n.2
evidence that were presented during the hearings."
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Documentation of Analyis
Unlike other federal or state impact assessment
procedures, review under Act 250 does not produce an
environmental impact assessment document. The "document"
that is produced is a formal decision to issue or deny a
permit. Arthur Hogan explained that, ".. the analysis in
the consultants' reports and the testimony taken during the
43 hearings constituted the impact assessment, this impact
assessment, in turn, provided the District Commission with
3 3
the necessary information to make their decision."
Initially, the evidence and technical analysis for each
criterion is fragmented. This information is presented
within the structure of the public hearings. It is the
District Commission's responsibility to synthesize and
evaluate this material, and based on the assessment of
impacts, render a decision. Since testimony was taken at
each of these hearings, the documentation of the analysis for
the Pyramid Mall proposal is voluminous. The decision,
therefore, represents a succinct statement of the findings
and discussion of the important issues.
The decision on the Pyramid Company's application is
contained in a 66 page document. Typically, a decision for a
permit is stated in 7-8 pages and follows a fairly standard
format. The length and level of detail in this case is
indicative of the serious review which the District
Commission took more than a year to render.
1.26
Conclusion
The Pyramid application was denied by the District
Commission in October of 1978. Since then, the Pyramid
Company has been unsuccessful in several appeals to the state
courts and has not exhibited any recent interest in reviving
the proposal.
In the aftermath of the District Commission's decision
to deny the Pyramid Company's application for a land use
permit, Burlington's Revitalization Program, although
initiated almost 20 years ago, has been noticeably more
active. The City has made an effort to enhance the
attractiveness of the commercial center through the Church
Street Market Place. This outdoor shopping mall is an
example of the recent urban phenomenon of the "festival
market place." The city has also secured federal funding to
build a 500-space parking garage and to provide additional
rooms and meeting space at the centrally-located Radisson
:34
Hotel.
The case of the proposed Pyramid Mall illustrates the
importance of the public hearing process in the
implementation of Act 250. In this particularly complex
application, the number of hearings were determined by the
significance or controversial nature of each criterion.
Hearings for a particular criterion continued until all
testimony was given and technical studies presented.
Although the technical nature of the hearings were too
tedious to keep the continued attention of most citizens it
still provided an open and accessible public forum. Unlike
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other impact assessment processes where the proponent, alone,
produces and presents technical evidence, all statutory
parties which represent a wide range of constituents (and
funding sources) can present evidence. The Commissioners,
themselves, are citizens of the district and have an interest
in a sound review process. The review of the Pyramid
Company's application fully exercised the public hearing
component of the Act 250 permit process.
Today, seven years after the District Commission's
decision to deny the Pyramid Company's request for an Act 250
permit, that decision and review process is still fresh in
the minds of many Vermonters. The denial of this application
is a landmark in Act 250's 15-year history.
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
A ct 250
AMC .
BLA . .
BPW .
CAC .
CEPA.
CEO .
CLF .
COE .
CZM .
DAS .
DEIS.
DEQE.
Vermont's Land Use and Development Act
Appalachian Mountain Club
Barry Lawson Associates
Bureau of Public Works, CT
Citizen Advisory Committee
Connecticut Environmental Policy Act
Council on Environmental Quality
Conservation Law Foundation of New England,
Inc.
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
Office of Coastal Zone Managment, MA
Department of Administrative Services, CT
Draft Environmental Impact Statement
Department Environmental Quality Engineering,
DOI . . . . . .. . U.S. Department of Interior
DOT . . . . . . . . U.S. Department of Transportation
DPWH. . . . . . . . Department of Public Works and Highways, NH
EIE . . . . . . . . Environmental Impact Evaluation, CT
EIR . . . . . . . . Environmental Impact Report, MA
EIS . . . . . . . . Environmental Impact Statement, US
EOEA . . . . . . . Executive Office of Environmental Quality
Engineering, MA
EPA . . . . . . . . U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
FHA . . . . . . . . U.S. Federal Highway Administration
FEIS. . . . . . .. Final Environmental Impact Statement
FEMA. . . . . . .. U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency
HAC . . . . . . .. Hartford Architectur'al Conservancy
HART. . . . . . . Hartford Area Rally Together
HRA . . . . . .. Hull Redevelopment Authority
HUD . . . . . . . U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development
1-93. . . . . . . . Interstate 93
MACC. . . . . . . . Massachusetts Association of Conservation
Commissions
MDC . . . . . . . . Metropolitan District Commission, MA
MEPA. . . . . . . . Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act
MWRA . . . . . . . . Massachusetts Water Resources Authority
NEPA. . . . . .. . National Environmental Policy Act
NRC . . . . . . . . Natural Resources Commission, ME
SEPA . . . . ... State Environmental Policy Act
SDEIS/DEIR. . . . . Supplemental Draft EIS/Draft EIR
SPNHF . . . . . . . Society for the Preservation of New Hampshire
Forests
TAG . . . . . . . . Technical Advisory Group, MA
URI . . . .. . . . University of Rhode Island
WRB . . . . . . . . Water Resource Board, RI
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APPENDIX D:
NOTES
I. Introduction
1. 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.
2. Rau and Wooten, 1980.
Canter, 1977.
Bacow, 1980.
4. Caldwell, 1982, p. 6.
5. 439 C.G.S.A. 22a-1 to -7.
30 M.A.L. Section 62-62H.
6. 10 V.S.A. Chapter 151A.
7. Yin, 1984, p. 23.
8. The complete text of the cases can be found in
Environmental Imgact Assessment Review Special Issue, "The
Role of Impact Assessment in Environmental Decision Making in
New England: A Ten Year Retrospective," Volume 6 Number 2.
9. See Appendix A.
II. Historical and Institutional Contex,,t
1. Black, 1981, p. 28.
2. Quarles, 1976, p. 11.
3. Caldwell, 1978, p. 2.
4. Black, 1981, p. 1.
5. Sax, 1971, p. 91.
6. Black, 1981, p. 2.
7. Black, 1981, p. 9.
8. Emery, 1973, p. 142.
9. Caldwell, 1978, p. 2.
10. Rau and Wooten, 1980, p. 1-2.
11. Rau and Wooten, 1980, p. 1-21.
12. 42 U.S.C. 4321, Section 2.
13. Grad, 1984, p. 9-5.
14. Grad, 1984, p. 9-5.
15. Grad, 1984, p. 9-6.
16. Yost, 1985.
17. Yost, 1985.
18. Yost, 1985, p. 42.
19. Yost, 1985, p. 43.
20. Hoffinger, 1983, p. 566.
21. Yost, 1985, p. 43.
22. Yost, 1985, p. 42.
23. Yost, 1985.
24. Gopelrud, 1979, p. 513.
25. Mendelker, 1976, p. 128.
26. Gopelrud, 1979.
27. Hoffinger, 1983, p. 564.
28. Hoffinger, 1983, p. 564.
29. Black, 1981, p. 29.
30. Sullivan, 1975, p. 548.
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(Chapter II, continued)
1. Erikson, 1979, p. 43.
37.2. Liroff, 1981, p. 317.
Liroff, 1980, p. 155.
33. Liroff, 1981, p. 318.
Black, 1981, p. 20.
34. Black:, 1981., p. 17.
Burchell and Listoken, 1975, p. 1.
35. Liroff, 1980, pp. 155-6.
36. Liroff, 1981, P. 319.
37. Liroff, 1981, p. 315.
38. Liroff, 1980, p. 154.
39. Yost, 1981, p. 507.
40. Council on Environmental Quality, 1976.
41. Susskind, 1978, p. 4 .
42. Environmental Resources Limited, 1981.
III. NEPA as a Model for SEPAs
1. Hagman, 1974, p. 4.
2. Yost, 1974, p. 50090.
3. Pearlman, 1971., p. 42.
4. Grad, 1984, p. 9-292.
5. Pearlman, 1971, p. 43.
6. Renz, 1984, p. 31.
Grad, 1984, p. 9-295.
Environment Reporter, 1985.
7. Renz, 1984., p. 31.
8. Renz, 1984, p. 32.
9. Renz, 1984, p. 32.
10. Renz, 1984, p. 43.
11. Black, 1981, p. 23.
12. Black., 1981, p. 23.
13. Renz, 1984, p. 32.
14. Renz, 1984, pp. 52-3.
15. Pearlman, 1971, p. 51.
16. Hagman, 1974, p. 49.
17. Pearlman, 1971, p. 51.
18. 439 C.G.S.A. 22a-14 to -27.
19. Johnson, 1972, p. 426.
20. 439 C.G.S.A 22a-1 to -If.
21. 439 C.G.S.A. 22a-1-4.
22. 439 C.G.S.A. 22a-lb.
23. 439 C.G.S.A. 22a-la-7(b).
24. 30 M.A.L. 62-62H.
25. 30 M.A.L. 62B.
26. 10) V.S.A. 151A.
I V. Analysis and Conclusions
1. The complete text of the cases can be found in
Environmental Impact Assessment Review Special Issue, "The
Role of Impact Assessment in Environmental Decision Making in
New England: A Ten Year Retrospective," Volume 6 Number 2.
2. See Appendix B for full text of case study.
3. This case study was prepared by Phyllis Robinson, 1985.
4. This case study was prepared by Phyllis Robinson, 1985.
5. This case study was prepared by Wendy Rundle, 1985.
(Chapter 4, continued)
6. This case study was prepared by Wendy Rundle, 1985.
7. See Appendix C for full text of case study.
8. This case study was prepared by Phyllis Robinson and
Wendy Rundle, 1985.
Apgendix. A: AggCoghg
1. Phyllis Robinson's assistance in this effort is greatly
appreciated.
2. See attachments.
3. The only exception to the criteria is the case from
Connecticut. After the survey was completed I decided that
one case should focus on social impact assessment. This case
was identified through a series of phone calls to
Connecticut's Office of Policy and Management that oversees
the implementation of the Connecticut Environmental Policy
Act.
4. Yin, 1980, p. 21.
2gngni2 x B: Case Study-Criminal Court Facility
1. 439 C.G.S.A. 22a-14 to -7.
2. 439 C.G.S.A. 22a-1 to 1f.
3. Johnson, 1972, p. 422.
4. Johnson, 1972, p. 426.
5. 439 C.G.S.A. 22a-1.
6. 439 C.G.S.A. 22a-lb(b).
7. A planning unit in which many of Connecticut's state
government buildings are located.
8. PRC HARRIS, 1982, p. I-11.
9. Cases are ranked A-E, A being the most severe.
10. PRC HARRIS, 1982, p. I-11.
11. PRC HARRIS, 1982, p. I-12.
12. PRC HARRIS, 1982, p. 1-16.
13. PRC HARRIS, 1982, p. 1-13.
14. PRC HARRIS, 1982, p. 1-13.
15. PRC HARRIS, 1982, p. 1-9.
16. Carlin & Pozzi Architects, 1981, p. 5.
17. PRC HARRIS, 1982, p. 1-9.
18. PRC HARRIS, 1982, p. I-10.
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(Appendix B, continued)
19. HART does block club organizing in Hartford.
20. Spitzner, personal communication.
21.. Gold, personal communication.
22. Pawlowski, personal communication.
23. PRC HARRIS, 1982, p. 1I-30.
24. PRC HARRIS., 1982, p. 11-39.
25. PRC HARRIS, 1982., p. 11-51.
26. PRC HARRIS, 1982, pp. I-1 to I-10.
Appen!4i' C: Case Study-yramid Mall
1. 10 V.S.A. 151A.
2. Act 250 was passed in response to a high growth rate and
general concern for the future of Vermont if unchecked
development were allowed to continue. See Healy, 1979, p.
40.
3. Green, 1978, p. 4.
4. Hemingway, 1978c.
5. Hemingway, 1978a.
6. Green, 1978, p. 4.
7. District Commission #4, 1978, p. 1.
8. Green, 1978, p. 4.
9. A plan that is intended to promote coordinated,
efficient and economic development of the state. 10 V.S.A.
151A Section 6042.
10. District Commission, #4, 1978, p. 3.
11. District Commission, #4, 1978, p. 19.
12. The District Commission does not have the authority to
negotiate a compromise with the developer regarding the
design of the proposed project.
13. Hemingway, 1978a.
14. District Commission, #4, 1978, p. 52.
15. Arthur Hogan, personal communication.
16. See criteria, page 3.
17. Peter Meyer, personal communication.
18. Muller, T. 1978. The Economic and Fiscal Effects of a
Erogsgg ghgaping Mall on the State of Vermont. (February).
19. District Commission, #4, 1978, p. 5.
20. A reasonably steady flow at about 80%4 capacity according
to guidelines of the American Association of State Highway
Transportation Officials.
21. An Analysis of the Impacts of the Proposed Pyramid Mall
on Greater Burlington Traffic Patterns" by Adler, Geinzer, and
Pitsckke, 1978.
22.. District Commission, #4, 1978, pp. 19, 22.
23. District Commission, #4, 1978, p. 23.
24. District Commission, #4, 1978, p. 22..
25. District Commission, #4, 1978, p. 15.
26. Hemingway, 1978c.
27. Hemingway, 1978b.
28. District Commission, #4, 1978, pp. 8-9.
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(Appendix C., continued)
29. District Commission, #4, 1978, p. 12.
30. District Commission, #4, 1978, pp. 25-27.
31. Bruce Hyde, personal communication.
32. Frank Murray, personal communication.
33. Arthur Hogan, personal communication.
34. Bruce Hyde, personal communication.
:13 4
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bacow, L.S. 1980. The Technical and Judgemental Dimensions
of Impact Assessment. Environmental Impact Assessment
Review. 1,2 pp. 109-124..
Black, P.E. 1981. Environmental Imgact Analysis. New York:
Praeger Publishers.
Burchell, R.W. and Listoken, D. 1975. The Environmental
Impagt Handbook. New Brunswick: Center for Urban Policy
Research, Rutgers University.
Bureau of National Affairs, Inc. 1985. Environment
Regorter. Washington, D.C.
Caldwell, L.K. 1978. Is NEPA Inherently Self-Defeating?
The EIS Process Under NEFA. Conference sponsored by
Environmental Law Institute (September 26).
Caldwell, L.K. 1982. Science and the National Environmental
Pgicy Act: Redirecting Folicy Through Procedural Reform.
University: University of Alabama Press.
Canter,9 L.W. 1977. Environmental Impact Assessment. New
York: McGraw-Hill Book Company.
439 Connecticut General Statutes Annotated Title 22a,
Connecticut Environmental Policy Act.
Council on Environmental Quality. 1976. An Analysis of Six
Years Exgerience by SeYenty Federal Agencies. PB-253 990.
Emery, D.K. 1973. The National Environmental Policy Act of
1969. An Attempt to Tailor Government Processes to
Environmental Needs. Oklahoma Law Review. 26:141-59.
Environmental Resources Limited. 1981. Environmental ImEact
Assessment. Prepared for the Ministry of Health and
Environmental Protection, The Netherlands.
Erikson, P.A. 1979. Environmental Im2 agt Assessment:
Einciges and a2lications. New York: Academic Press.
Gopelrud, C.P. 1979. NEPA at Nine: Alive and Well or
Wounded in Action? Dakota Law Review. 55:497-524.
Grad, F.P. 1984. Treatise of Environmental Law. New York:
Matthew Bender.
Hagman, D.G. 1974. NEPA's Progeny Inhabit the States--Were
the Genes Defective? Urban Law Annual. 7:3-56.
1.35
Hoffinger, F. 1983. Environmental Impact Statements:
Instruments for Environmental Protection or Endless
Litigation? Fordham Urban Law Journal. XI:527-66.
Johnson, H. 1972. The Environmental Protection Act of 1971.
Connecticut Bar Journal. 46:422-447.
Liroff, R.A. 1980. NEPA--Where Have We Been and Where are
We Going? APA Journal. 46, 2:154-161.
Liroff, R.A. 1981. NEPA Litigation in the 1970s: A Desluge
or a Dribble? Natural Resources Journal. 21:315-30.
30 Massachusetts Annotated Laws Sections 62-62H.
Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act.
Mendelker, D.R. 1976. Environmental and Land Controls
Legislation. New York: Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc.
Pearlman, K. 1977. State Environmental Policy Acts: Local
Decision Making and Land Use Planning. AIP Journal. 43,1:42-
53.
Purdy, J.C. 1978. Variation in Decision Making Among
Vermont District Environmental Commissions. Master's Thesis,
Department of Urban Studies and Planning, M.I.T.
Quarles, J. 1971. Cleaning g America: An Insider's View
of the Environmental Protectign Agency. Boston: Houghton
Mifflin Company.
Rau, J.G. and Wooten, D.C.. editors. 1980. Environmental
Impact Analysis Handbook. New York: McGraw-Hill Book
Company.
Renz, J.T. 1984. The Coming of Age of State Environmental
Policy Acts. Public Land Review. 5:31-54.
Sax, J.L. 1971. Defending the Environment: A Strate for
Citizen Action. New York: Alfred A Knopf.
Sullivan, M.A. 1975. Four Years of Environmental Impact
Statements: A Review of Agency Administration of NEPA.
Akron Law Review. e:543-569.
Susskind, L.E. 1978. It's Time to Shift Our Attention from
Impact Assessment to Strategies for Resolving Environmental
Disputes. Environmental Impact Assessment Review. 2:4-8.
42 United States Codes 4321-4347. National Environmental
Policy Act.
10 Vermont Statutes Annotated Chapter 151A. Land Use and
Development Act (Act 250).
136
Yin, R... 1984. Case Study Research Design and Methods.
Beverly Hills: Sage Publications.
Yost, N.C. 1974. NEPA's Progency: State Environmental
Policy Acts. Environmental Law Regorter. 3: 5009C)-50098.
Yost, N.C. 1981. Streamlining NEPA--an Environmental
Success Story. Bgston College Environmental Affairs Law
Review. 9:507-12.
Yost, N.C. 1985. CEQ: America's Conscience. Environment.
27, 3:42-53.
Case Study: Criminal Court Facility, Connecticut
Carlin & Pozzi Architects. 1981. Summary Alternative Study
Criminal Court Facility Hartford,_ Connecticut. Project No:
BI-JD-2. (March 12).
439 Connecticut General Statutes Annotated Title 22a.
Johnson, H.N. 1972. The Environmental Protection Act of
1971. Connecticut Bar Journal. 46:422-447.
PRC HARRIS, Division of PRC Engineering, Inc. 1982.
Environmental Imgact Evaluation Criminal Court Facility.
Hartford.L CT. Project BI-JD-28-1. Prepared for Connecticut
Department of Administrative Services, Bureau of Public
Works. (March 30).
Personal Communications
Michael Allison, Hartford Area Rally Together, March 1985.
Ron Cretaro, Hungerford Block Association, March, 1985.
Ed Dooling, Office of Policy and Management, March 1985.
Toni Gold, former Executive Director, Hartford Architectural
Conservancy, March 1985.
Michael Kersky, Hartford Architectural Conservancy, March
1985.
Bob Pawlowski, Southside News, March 1985.
Eugene Puhopek, Bureau of Public Works, State of Connecticut,
April 1985.
137
E. Peter Spitzner, Hartford City Planning Department, April
1985.
Kathryn Vernon, Department of Administrative Services, March
1985.
Case Study: Pyrami d Mall. Vermont
District Commission #4. 1978. Application #4CO281 Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Order Denying Land Use
Permit. (October 12).
Environmental Board, 1981. Act 250: A Performance
Evaluation. March 1981.
Green, A. 1978. The Battle of Pyramid Mall. Environmental
Action. 10, 13: 4-7.
Healy, R.G. and Rosenberg, J.S. 1979. Land Use and the
States. Resources for the Future, Johns Hopkins Press.
Hemingway, S. 1978a. Pyramid Plan Forced Officials to
Scrutinize Many Issues. Burlingtgn Eree Press. (October 10).
Hemingway, S. 1978b. Economic Impact Leads Crtieria Weighed
in Mall Decision. Burlington Eree Press. (October 10).
Hemingway, S. 1978c. Decision Due Tonight on Pyramid Mall's
Plan. Burlingtgn Free Press. (October 12).
10 Vermont Statutes Annotated Chapter 151A.
Personal Communications
Arthur Hogan, Chittendon County Regional Planning
Commission, March 1985.
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